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I. INTRODUCTION
Customary International Law (CIL) is in trouble. It is in trouble
notwithstanding the fact that it is central to our understanding of interna-
tional law, is one of the two main sources of international law, and is the
primary source of universal law.1 In some sense, international law would
not be possible without at least some norms of CIL, most conspicuously
the requirement that treaties are to be obeyed.2
Despite its privileged position, CIL is under attack from all sides.3
Some scholars complain that it is incoherent,4 others assert that it is ir-
1. See, e.g., Brigitte Stem, Custom at the Heart of International Law, 11 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 89, 89 (2001) ("[C]ustom enjoys privileged status in the international order:
'custom is even more central than the treaty'...." (quoting and translating PAUL REUTER,
INTRODUCTION AU DROIT DES TRAITES 38 (1972)). Though treaties have come to govern large
areas of international law, there remain important areas of international law governed wholly
or partially by CIL either because no treaties are in place or because treaties are not universal
or do not cover all relevant issues. These areas include, for example, the law of state responsi-
bility, foreign direct investment, the jurisdiction to apply law, diplomatic immunity, human
rights, and state immunity.
2. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 26, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, 339 ("Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be per-
formed by them in good faith."); MICHAEL BYERS, CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF
RULES 107 (1999) ("Treaty rules ... are based on the general customary rule of pacta sunt
servanda, which requires that treaty obligations be upheld in good faith."); ANTHONY A.
D'AMATO, THE CONCErT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 130 (1971). Though the bind-
ingness of treaties is itself provided for in a treaty, some more fundamental rule about the
enforceability of treaties is needed to make it effective.
3. See David P. Fidler, Challenging the Classical Concept of Custom: Perspectives on
the Future of Customary International Law, 39 GERMAN Y.B. INT'L L. 198 (1996).
4. "The questions of how custom comes into being and how it can be changed or
modified are wrapped in mystery and illogic." D'AMATO, supra note 2, at 4; Michael Ake-
hurst, Custom as a Source of International Law, 47 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 1 (1977)
("[I]nternational lawyers ... invoke rules of customary international law every day, but they
have great difficulty in agreeing on a definition . ... "); Mark A. Chinen, Game Theory and
Customary International Law: A Response to Professors Goldsmith and Posner, 23 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 143, 178 (2001) ("[M]ost commentators acknowledge that opinio juris is a concept
for which it is difficult to account with any consistency, even though most acknowledge the
need for some concept that will distinguish behaviors that have legal consequences from those
that do not."); Phillip R. Trimble, A Revisionist View of Customary International Law, 33
[Vol. 27:115
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relevant or a fiction,5 and virtually everyone agrees that the theory and
doctrine of CIL is a mess. 6 These concerns, though not new, have taken
on a more aggressive tone in recent years.
The problem is aggravated by the fact that CIL is singularly ill-
equipped to respond. CIL has no coherent or agreed upon theory to jus-
tify its role or explain its doctrine.' The old notions of natural law and
consent, which were once used to explain CIL, are either no longer ac-
cepted or under-theorized (or both), and nothing has arisen to take their
place.8 As a result, CIL stands virtually defenseless and unable to counter
critiques with much more than unsupported claims about its importance.
Until a foundational theory of CIL is developed, a coherent response to
critics will remain out of reach and existing defenses will be unpersua-
sive.9
This Article offers just such a theory of CIL-one that provides a
firm and modem theoretical foundation for the analysis of custom.
Though this is not the first article to propose a view of CIL through a
UCLA L. REV. 665, 709 (1986) ("[T]here are basic theoretical problems inherent in the idea
of customary international law... ).
5. See JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
43 (2005) ("[CIL] is not an exogenous influence on state behavior."); Francis A. Boyle, The
Irrelevance of International Law: the Schism Between International Law and International
Politics, 10 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 193, 198 (1980) ("International law is therefore irrelevant to
those matters which count the most, or more forcefully, to those matters that count for any-
thing in international relations."); Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary
International Law, 66 CHI. L. REv. 1113 (1999); Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, Under-
standing the Resemblance Between Modem and Traditional Customary International Law, 40
VA. J. INT'L L. 639, 640 (2000) ("The faulty premise is that CIL ... influences national be-
havior.").
6. See, e.g., Akehurst, supra note 4, at 1 (observing that scholars are not able to agree
on a definition of CIL); J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International Law, 40 VA.
J. INT'L L. 449, 450 (2000) ("[T]here is neither a common understanding of how customary
international legal norms are formed, nor agreement on the content of those norms."); Edward
T. Swaine, Rational Custom, 52 DUKE L.J. 559, 563 (2002) ("Even custom's most ardent
supporters, however, have difficulty explaining how it arises, and more particularly, why cus-
tomary practices should be considered binding on states.").
7. See, e.g., Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Cus-
tomary International Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 757, 757 (2001) ("The
renaissance of custom requires the articulation of a coherent theory....").
8. See ALFRED VERDROSS & HERIBERT KOECK, Natural Law: The Tradition of Univer-
sal Reason and Authority, in THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 17
(Ronald Macdonald & Douglas Johnston eds., 1983) (natural law); See also infra note 113
(consent).
9. See Kelly, supra note 6, at 500 ("Controversy is inevitable because the elements of
CIL legal theory are empty vessels in which to pour one's own normative theory of interna-
tional law .... Rather than undergoing a revitalization, CIL is disintegrating into a useless,
incoherent source of law that is of little guidance in determining norms.").
Fall 2005]
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rational choice lens,'0 it is the first to map out a general theory of CIL
based on such a model."
In some respects, the effort to develop a proper theory with which to
analyze CIL could be seen as an attack on classical notions of custom.
This Article suggests that our understanding of CIL must change and
points out ways in which current views of the subject are untenable. De-
spite this reformist feature, however, the Article is fundamentally
constructive. It seeks to rescue CIL from its critics and to advance a
comprehensive and sound version of CIL. This admittedly requires some
changes to current notions of CIL, but it retains the basic contours-an
understanding of how behavioral norms among states can come to have
the force of international law. Without the proposed changes, it is hard to
see how CIL as we now know it can retain any vitality and relevance to
the way in which we think about international law.
It should be noted at the outset that many of the criticisms of CIL are
powerful because they are correct. Certainly, existing views of CIL lack
consistency and coherence, commentators on the subject commonly
make assumptions about state behavior that seem implausible,'2 and ad-
vocates make claims about CIL that are difficult to square with the
observed behavior of states.' 3 None of these criticisms, however, rule out
10. See Mark A. Chinen, Afterward, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 201 (2001); Chinen, supra
note 4; Goldsmith & Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, supra note 5, at 1113;
Goldsmith & Posner, Understanding the Resemblances Between Modem and Traditional
Customary International Law, supra note 5, at 639; Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based
Theory of International Law, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1823 (2002); Swaine, supra note 6; Pierre-
Hugues Verdier, Cooperative States: International Relations, State Responsibility and the
Problem of Custom, 42 VA. L. REv. 839 (2002); Vincy Fon & Francesco Parisi, Customary
Law and Articulation Theories: An Economic Analysis (George Mason Law and Economics
Research Paper No. 02-24), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstractid=335220; Vincy Fon & Francesco Parisi, Stability and Change in Interna-
tional Customary Law (George Mason Law and Economics Research Paper No. 03-21),
available at http://papers.ssm.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstractid=399960; Francesco Parisi,
The Formation of Customary Law (George Mason Law and Economics Research Paper No.
01-06), available at http://papers.ssm.comsol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=262032.
11. See Verdier (2002), supra note 10, at 841 ("[I]nstitutionalist scholars have focused
on formal regimes established by multilateral treaties, they have neglected the customary
norms and regimes that form the backbone of many fundamental areas of international law.")
(footnote omitted). There are, of course, exceptions, but none of them offers a new theoretical
justification and explanation of CIL that resembles the one presented in this Article. Cf supra
note 10.
12. See Roberts, supra note 7, at 769 ("The greatest criticism of modem custom is that
it is descriptively inaccurate because it reflects ideal, rather than actual, standards of con-
duct.").
13. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980) (arguing that torture is
a violation of customary human rights); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 702 cmt. g. & rep. n.5 (1987). But see Joan Fitzpatrick, The
Relevance of Customary International Norms to the Death Penalty in the U.S., 25 GA. J. INT'L
[Vol. 27:115
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the possibility that there are international legal norms that, by virtue of
that status, affect state behavior.
In more pragmatic terms, one might ask whether the impact of CIL,
whatever it may have been in the past, has faded to the point of irrele-
vance. After all, modern international relations have made the treaty a
more important tool, relative to CIL, than it has been in the past, and
there are myriad ways for states to cooperate through soft law instru-
ments that fall short of treaties.'
4
Despite these trends, however, an understanding of custom is critical
to an understanding of international law. First, there remain important
areas of international relations governed primarily by customary rules.
5
To pick one example, the law of state responsibility remains largely the
domain of custom.16
Second, even in areas where one or more treaties exist, CIL often
plays an important role. For example, in the human rights area there are
a number of important treaties, but there remains the question of which
human rights rules have the status of CIL and therefore apply to all
states, including non-signatories.'
& CoMP. L. 165, 173 (1995) (questioning the proposition that the prohibition on torture is
customary international law by noting that torture is a widespread practice); Arthur M. Weis-
burd, The Effect of Treaties and Other Formal International Acts on the Customary Law of
Human Rights, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 99, 120-22 (1996). For the proposition that states
have an international obligation to prevent injury to the environment of another state, see RE-
STATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 601 (1987);
Mary Ellen O'Connell, Enforcing the New International Law of the Environment, 35 GERMAN.
Y.B. INT'L L. 293, 303 (1992). But see Karl Zemenak, State Responsibility & Liability, in
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION & INTERNATIONAL LAW 187, 188 (Winfried Lang et al. eds.,
1991) (noting the lack of general and consistent state practice).
14. See Kal Raustiala, Form and Substance in International Agreements, 99 AM. J.
INT'L L. 581 (2005).
15. Critics of CIL may respond that areas said to be within the domain of custom are
subject to no rules at all. If this is true, it is because CIL does not apply to the relevant issues,
or perhaps it is entirely irrelevant to state behavior. In either case, one can only arrive at a
conclusion regarding the role of CIL in these areas after one has developed an understanding
of CIL.
16. In an effort to enumerate these rules, the International Law Commission adopted in
2001 the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. See Int'l
L. Comm'n, Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, ch. IV. E.1, U.N.
GAOR 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (Nov. 2001).
17. The same is true in the investment area, where bilateral investment treaties (BITS)
dominate the legal landscape, but many investments are not covered by a BIT. There is debate
about whether the legal rules included in BITs have become rules of CIL. See Bernard Kishoi-
yian, The Utility of Bilateral Investment Treaties in the Formulation of Customary
International Law, 14 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 327, 329 (1994) ("[E]ach BIT is nothing but lex
specialis between parties."); Asoka de Z. Gunawardana, The Inception and Growth of Bilat-
eral Investment Promotion and Protection Treaties, 86 PROc. AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 544, 550
(1992) (stating that BITs affect the CIL rules governing investments).
Fall 20051
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CIL can also serve to influence treaty regimes. Treaties, for instance,
sometimes refer to rules of customary international law, making such
rules relevant to the interpretation of the treaty. ' Additionally, CIL pro-
vides rules of treaty interpretation that are important to treaties,
especially in the context of dispute resolution.' 9
Third, CIL is sometimes relevant to or a part of domestic law. In the
United States, for example, the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) 0 grants federal
courts jurisdiction over cases in which an alien sues for a tort committed
in violation of CIL. In the famous Filartiga case,2' the Second Circuit
concluded that CIL was enforceable in the United States through the
ATS.22 The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law subsequently
incorporated this perspective, stating that "customary international law is
considered to be like common law in the United States, but it is federal
law.'23 In the 2004 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain case,24 the Supreme Court
held that no rule of CIL supported Alvarez's claim of arbitrary deten-
tion,25 but it acknowledged that CIL was a legitimate basis for a claim
under the ATS. 6 As the Sosa case demonstrates, once CIL can be consid-
ered part of or relevant to domestic law, it must be interpreted by
domestic courts. Such an interpretation is only possible if we first have
an understanding of what CIL is and how it works.27
18. See, e.g., United States Model Bilateral Investment Treaty art. II, (Apr. 1994), re-
printed in U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
INSTRUMENTS: A COMPENDIUM, 198, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DTC/30(Vol. III) (1996) (stating
the signatories will in no case provide investment from their treaty partner "treatment less
favorable than that required by [customary] international law").
19. See. e.g., WTO Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement
of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 2, art. 3.2, 33 I.L.M. 114, 115 (1994) ("Members ... recognize that [the Dispute Set-
tlement Understanding] serves to ... clarify the existing [WTO] provisions .. . in accordance
with customary rules of interpretation of public international law."); Appellate Body Report,
United States-Standards for Conventional and Reformulated Gasoline, art. 31,
WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996) ('That general rule of interpretation [contained in art. 31 of
the Vienna Convention] has attained the status of a rule of customary or general international
law. As such, it forms part of the 'customary rules of interpretation of public international law'
which the Appellate Body has been directed... to apply.").
20. Judiciary Act, ch. 20, § 9, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
21. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
22. Id. at 880.
23. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ Ill n.4 (1987).
24. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
25. Id. at 757.
26. Id. at 751-53.
27. On the Alien Tort Statute in general and the Sosa case in particular, see Anne-Marie
Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of 1789: A Badge of Honor, 83 AM. J.
INT'L L. 461 (1989); Harold H. Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J.
2347 (1991); Julian Ku & John Yoo, Beyond Formalism in Foreign Affairs: A Functional Ap-
[Vol. 27:115
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Fourth, custom remains an integral part of the rhetoric used in the in-
ternational legal landscape. Countries routinely reference CIL to support
their actions and those of their allies, or to condemn behavior by other
states. Two examples suffice to illustrate this reality. The United States
has often claimed that there exists a rule of CIL prohibiting the expro-
priation of foreign investment without prompt, adequate, and effective
compensation,28 and the European Union has appealed to CIL for the
claim that the "precautionary principle" affects state obligations.29 To
understand the relevance and role of that rhetoric, we must first under-
stand CIL itself.
Fifth, CIL is one of the recognized sources of international law.3 °
One could hardly claim to understand international law without an un-
derstanding of CIL, how it works, and its relevance. Even if one seeks to
dismiss the relevance of CIL as a source of law, it is necessary to have
some understanding of what CIL is.
Finally, as previously mentioned, whatever other purposes CIL
serves, it is the basis for the requirement that states honor treaties.' Un-
derstanding custom, then, helps us to understand treaties.
This Article takes on the challenge of building a workable and de-
fensible theory of CIL. To do so, it makes standard rational choice
assumptions about state behavior. In particular, it assumes that states are
able to identify their own interests and act to further those interests.
States have no innate preference for complying with international law
and so will only comply when doing so makes them better off. They are
proach to the Alien Tort Statute, 2004 Sup. CT. REV. 153; Edward T. Swaine, The Constitu-
tionality of International Delegations, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 1492 (2004); J. Harvie Wilkinson
III, Our Structural Constitution, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 1687 (2004).
28. See Amoco Int'l Fin. Corp. v. Government of the Islamic Rep. of Islam, 15 Iran-
U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 189, 223, 234 (1987); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 712 cmt. d (1987).
29. See WTO Appellate Body Report, European Communities - Measures Concerning
Meat and Meat Products, 120-25, WTO Doc. WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, 48 (Jan.
16, 1998).
30. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38.
31. See supra note 2; see also MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION To INTERNATIONAL
LAW 66 (3d ed. 1993) ("Probably no rule better fits the definition of a norm of jus cogens than
pacta sunt senranda, for it is essential to the theory of both conventional and customary inter-
national law that contracts between states be legally binding."). It is true that the obligation to
honor treaties also finds expression in the Vienna Convention. See Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, art. 26, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/27 (May 23, 1969), reprinted in Official
Documents: Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 63 Am. J. INT'L L. 875 (1969). Not all
states are party to the treaty and yet it remains the case that even non-parties (including the
United States) are thought to have an obligation to comply with treaties. Furthermore, the
Vienna Convention is itself a treaty, so there remains the question of why states are required to
comply with it. CIL provides part of the answer.
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unaffected by the "legitimacy" of a rule of law,32 past consent to a rule is
insufficient to ensure compliance,33 and there is no assumption that deci-
sionmakers have internalized a norm of compliance with international
law.1
4
The Article models cooperation among states using a repeated pris-
oner's dilemma. Recognizing that states interact repeatedly with one
another over time leads to the conclusion that rules of CIL can affect
payoffs and, therefore, provide an incentive toward compliance. This,
then, is what the Article takes as its definition of CIL-a norm that, by
virtue of its status as a legal rule, affects the payoffs of states.35
Whenever groups (including groups of states) interact, behavioral
norms emerge. Some of the norms that have emerged among states are
known as legal rules-rules of customary law. In the absence of a supra-
national authority capable of identifying legal rules, it is left to the states
themselves to determine which norms achieve this status. This corre-
sponds roughly with what, in existing discussions of CIL, is known as
opiniojuris or the "subjective" element of CIL.36
Under traditional conceptions of CIL, the other requirement is a
demonstration of consistent state practice, referred to as the "objective"
element.37 A rational choice approach, however, looks to compliance and
incentives affecting state behavior. This, it turns out, leaves no room for
a practice requirement. Because the consequences of violating a legal
rule depend only on the attitudes of other states, state practice plays no
direct role. Practice may affect the attitudes of states, of course, but it
does not directly contribute to the existence of a rule of CIL. Practice
may also be relevant as evidence of opinio juris, but this is a different
role than the one traditionally assigned to it and has different implica-
tions, as explained in Part IV.
The Article is organized as follows: Part II discusses the pressure
placed on existing notions of CIL by both traditional and modern critics.
Part III develops a theory of CIL under the assumption that states are
32. See generally THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTI-
TUTIONS (1995); Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in the International System, 82 AM. J. INT'L
L. 705 (1988).
33. See Louis Henkin, International Law: Politics, Values and Functions, 216 RECUEIL
DES COURs D'ACADEMIE DE DROIT INT'L 19, 27 (1989) ("[A] state is not subject to any exter-
nal authority unless it has voluntarily consented to such authority.").
34. See Harold H. Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 182-83
(1996); Harold H. Koh, Why do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599
(1997).
35. See infra Part II.
36. See infra Part IV.A.
37. Id.
[Vol. 27:115
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rational actors that only comply with international law when they have
sufficient incentives to do so. Part IV presents a positive analysis of CIL,
explaining how CIL can exist and how conventional accounts of CIL
must change to accommodate this revised understanding. That same Part
also considers the implications of the theory for our understanding of
instant custom and special custom. Part V turns to a more normative
analysis of certain doctrinal rules of CIL, considering the impact of the
rules concerning persistent objectors, subsequent objectors, and new
states and describing the preferred approach to each. Part VI concludes.
II. THE ATTACK ON CIL
A. CIL
The most commonly cited and authoritative definition of CIL is
found in article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice,
which provides that "international custom, as evidence of a general prac-
tice accepted as law" is one of the sources of international law.39 A
similar definition is offered by the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Rela-
tions Law of the United States, which defines CIL as "result[ing] from a
general and consistent practice of States followed by them from a sense
of legal obligation.'
CIL, then, is normally said to have two elements. First, there is an
objective element consisting of sufficient state practice ("general prac-
tice" under the ICJ definition and "consistent practice" under the
restatement). Second, there is a subjective element, known as opinio ju-
ris, which requires that the practice be accepted as law or followed from
a sense of legal obligation.4'
This definition of custom is the most traditional and the one that is
taught to law students. As discussed below, however, it has a host of
problems.
38. Among CIL's many problems is the fact that there are few aspects of it upon which
all commentators agree. This is a function of the notorious theoretical weakness in the area.
The diversity of views presents something of a challenge for this Article because as a new
theoretical foundation for CIL is developed, it is necessary to discuss the existing state of legal
doctrine. Rather than providing an exhaustive catalogue of views, this Article attempts to pre-
sent the mainstream or majority view whenever possible, while also providing important
alternative views.
39. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38 sec. 1 cl. b; IAN BROWNLIE,
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (4th ed. 1990).
40. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES,
§ 102(2) (1987).
41. ld. at cmt. c.
Fall 20051
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B. Traditional Critiques
A central theme in many traditional critiques is the imprecise charac-
ter of CIL. Karol Wolfke, for example, argues that the problem with
custom "lies in the intangibility of custom, in the numerous factors
which come into play, in the great number of various views, spread over
centuries, and in the resulting ambiguity of the terms involved.' " Vague-
ness about legal rules, however, need not be fatal. After all, common law
adjudication is in significant part about the clarification or establishment
of rules that are applied to disputes ex post. That said, the lack of preci-
sion in CIL rules does indeed undermine the force of the rules and
generate skepticism about their importance.
Beyond vagueness, there is a laundry list of problems with CIL that
have long been understood. Anthony D'Amato made perhaps the best
presentation of those concerns in his well-known book, The Concept of
Custom in International Law.43 One of the most vexing problems dis-
cussed by D'Amato is the inherent circularity of CIL." It is said that CIL
is only law if the opiniojuris requirement is met. That is, it is only law if
states believe it is law.45 But why would a state believe something to be
law if it does not already have the requisite opinio juris? So it appears
that opinio juris is necessary for there to be a rule of law, and a rule of
law is necessary for there to be opiniojuris.
Other problems with the conventional definition of CIL are easy to
find. Like the opinio juris requirement, the state practice norm is said to
be unworkable. There is no agreement on the amount or consistency of
practice that is required.4 1 It is clear that universal state practice is not
42. KAROL WOLFKE, CUSTOM IN PRESENT INTERNATIONAL LAW, xiii (2d ed. 1993).
43. See D'AMATO, supra note 2; Trimble, supra note 4.
44. BYERS, supra note 2, at 136-37; Trimble, supra note 4, at 710 ("The definition [of
CIL] obviously has a circular tendency.").
45. "But if custom creates law, how can a component of custom require that the creative
acts be in accordance with some prior right or obligation in international law? ... How can
custom create law if its psychological component requires action in conscious accordance
with law preexisting the action?" D'AMATO, supra note 2, at 53, 66; see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 102 rep. n.2 (1987).
46. See D'AMATO, supra note 2, at 58 ("[T]he literature contains no standards or crite-
ria for determining how much time is necessary to create a usage that can qualify as
customary international law ...."). For example, in The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 686
(1900), the Supreme Court traced the fishing vessel exemption rule from the year 1403 until
the year of the case, 1900, noting the occasional setbacks in the rule, but concluding that it
was "established in our own country and generally throughout the civilized world." On the
other hand, in Military and Paramilitary Activities, while noting that state practice is essential
in finding a customary rule of law, the ICJ emphasized and focused on the importance of
opiniojuris. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 108-10 (June
27).
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necessary, but beyond that the opinions of commentators diverge. 7 For
example, it is unclear whether a single inconsistent act is sufficient to
conclude that there has not been "continuous" state practice. Further-
more, if a single inconsistent act is not enough to undermine the
consistency of the practice, how much inconsistency is required?
4.
Even if agreement could be reached on the consistency element, it is
difficult to determine how widespread the practice must be. One might
hope that the ICJ would provide guidance here, but when the court has
addressed the issue it has failed to offer clarity. Judge Lachs, in his dis-
sent in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, for example, did little
more than restate the problem when he commented that a "general prac-
tice of States," which is something less than "universal acceptance," is
sufficient evidence that a practice is accepted as law.49
Ultimately, the question is one of the overall importance of practice,
and there is no consensus on that issue. In the Anglo-Norwegian Fisher-
ies case, the ICJ stated that "the Court considers that too much
importance need not be attached to the few uncertainties or contradic-
tions, real or apparent, which the United Kingdom Government claims to
have discovered in Norwegian practice."50 Though this quote seems to
indicate that practice is of modest consequence, the court then empha-
sized the importance of "constant and sufficiently long practice."5'
Furthermore, there is no agreement on the forms of evidence that
may be used to demonstrate state practice. A liberal view of acceptable
evidence of practice includes not only the actual actions of states, but
also diplomatic correspondence, treaties, public statements by heads of
state, domestic laws, and so on.52 Though there is support for this view,
one can also find prominent commentators arguing for a much shorter
list.53
47. See J. L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 61 (1936); Trimble, supra note 4, at 679.
For instance, both the United States Supreme Court in Paquete Habana and the I.C.J. in S.S.
Wimbledon, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser A.) No. 1 (Jan. 16), found rules of customary law from the
practice of fewer than a dozen states.
48. See Guzman, supra note 10, at 1874. In Military and Paramilitary Activities, the
ICJ stated that state practice did not have to be in "absolutely rigorous conformity with the
rule" and "that instances of state conduct inconsistent with a given rule should generally have
been treated as breaches of that rule, not as indications of the recognition of a new rule." 1986
I.C.J. 186, at 98.
49. North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den., F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 229,
231 (Feb. 20); see also John A. Perkins, The Changing Foundations of International Law:
From State Consent to State Responsibility, 15 B.U. INTL L. J. 433, 462-63 (1997).
50. Fisheries (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116, 138 (Dec. 18, 1951).
51. Id. at 139.
52. See Akehurst, supra note 4, at 1.
53. See Trimble, supra note 4, at 679-81 (pointing out that some commentators believe
UN General Assembly Resolutions qualify as practice, while others do not).
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D'Amato, for example, asserts that only physical acts count and
statements by diplomats or UN officials cannot be considered state prac-
tice.5" The U.S. Department of State put forward a slightly more
expansive position in the 1970s, stating that government acts, such as
treaties, executive agreements, federal regulations, federal court deci-
sions, and internal memoranda, count as state practice but resolutions of
international bodies do not.55 In contrast, many CIL theorists, including
Simma, Alston,56 Meron, and Sohn,57 allow drafts of the International
Law Commission, resolutions of the UN General Assembly, and recitals
in international instruments to count as evidence of state practice. The
International Law Commission itself considers the cumulative practices
of international organizations as evidence of state practice.59
Even if one could resolve the above problems about what counts as
practice and the degree of consistency required, there remains the practi-
cal problem that observing all relevant evidence from all relevant states
will normally be impossible. At the most mundane level, few nations
document their actions and statements in a way that allows for an inves-
tigation of their practices. 60
Furthermore, it is fantastical to think that lawyers in a case, much
less adjudicators deciding a case or policymakers selecting a course of
action, can canvass the virtually infinite universe of potential evidence,
let alone come to some understanding of the extent to which a practice
has been followed. 6' The challenge is even greater when one realizes that
a proper investigation of state practice would consider instances in which
states refrain from taking an action because it would be in violation of
international law. This latter category of evidence would be the most
relevant to an investigation of CIL. The fact that it is unobservable, how-
54. D'AMATO, supra note 2, at 88.
55. See 1973 DIGEST OF THE UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW V
(Arthur W. Rovine ed., 1974).
56. Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus
Cogens, and General Principles, 12 AUSTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 82, 89-90 (1992) ("[R]ules or prin-
ciples proclaimed, for instance, by the General Assembly ... are taken not only as starting
points for the possible development of customary law in the event that State practice happens
to lock on to these proclamations, but as a law-making process which is more or less complete
in itself, even in the face of contrasting 'external' facts.").
57. See THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS CUSTOM-
ARY LAW 79-106 (1989); see generally Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law:
Protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather Than States, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 1 (1982).
58. BROWNLIE, supra note 39, at 5.
59. See Int'l L. Comm'n, Report of the International Law Commission to the General
Assembly, U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 12), U.N. Doc. A/1316 (1950), reprinted in [1950] 2 YB.
INT'L L. COMM'N 364, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/Ser.A/1950/Add.1.
60. See Byers, supra note 2, at 144 n. 119.
61. Fidler, supra note 3, at 202.
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ever, makes it virtually impossible to include in the evaluation of CIL.62
Even if one can identify instances in which states claim to be refraining
from certain actions based on CIL, it is difficult to know if they are do-
ing so out of a sincere concern for CIL or if expressions of concern are
simply a convenient rhetorical justification for their decision.
The interpretation of observable evidence of state action is also
problematic. The most visible evidence consists of statements made by
countries, including votes in international fora such as the UN General
Assembly. Unfortunately, this evidence is also the least reliable, as states
may have incentives to misrepresent their beliefs about CIL. In practice,
such statements are at times used as evidence by international courts,
including the ICJ.
63
Finally, in addition to these problems of evidence, attempts to de-
termine state practice inevitably face time and resource constraints,
preventing a serious canvassing of all relevant information. The result is
that judgments are based on cursory reviews of a few states, biased to-
ward the practices of states with readily available statements about their
behavior written in a language understood by the relevant judges,6 heav-
ily influenced by the particular background of the judge, and often
inconsistent with the behavior of many states.65
These problems, along with others that are omitted from this brief
discussion, make it difficult to take traditional theories of CIL seriously
if one approaches the subject with even mild skepticism.66 One illustra-
tion of this problem appears in an article by Kelly, who concludes that
62. Some such instances may be observable either based on the circumstances of the
case or as a result of credible claims by states, but in many cases it will be very difficult to
identify such behavior. Because the task is to get a picture of the overall practice of states it is
important to have some sense of what states do in general and not only in individual cases.
63. See Military and Paramilitary Activities, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 99 188; Part IV.
64. One likely result is a bias toward large, powerful, western states. See Kelly, supra
note 6, at 472. This bias is evident in Texaco v. Libya, 17 I.L.M. 1, 29 86 (1978), where the
arbiter explicitly stated that the "legal value of the resolutions" depended on who voted for the
resolution - if "developed countries with market economies which carry on the largest part of
international trade" did not support a resolution, then the resolution was not legally binding.
But see In the Matter of the Republic of the Philippines, Entscheidungen des Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht, [BVerfG] (federal constitutional court) 46, 342 (ER.G.) (1977), translated in
DECISIONS OF THE BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND LAW OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 1952-1989, 358 (1992) (analyzing the relevant provisions, judicial
decisions, and administrative practices of 108 foreign states before deciding whether an inter-
national customary law prohibited the disputed conduct in the case).
65. This problem is partially alleviated in circumstances where the relevant number of
states is small and planners or adjudicators need only canvass the behavior of that limited
group. Even in these circumstances, however, there remains the problem of determining what
behavior should be considered as evidence of practice.
66 See Kelly, supra note 6, at 500.
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CIL is "a useless, incoherent source of law that is of little guidance in
determining norms." Even on its own terms, CIL is a problematic area.
The basic definitions of CIL are at best difficult to understand and apply
and certain to lead to inconsistent judgments about the content of the
67law; at worst they are incoherent and internally inconsistent.
C. Modem Skeptics
More recently a different critique has gained prominence. This line
of argument, most forcefully developed by Goldsmith and Posner, uses
conventional rational choice assumptions to claim that CIL does not af-
fect state behavior or, at least, has very little impact.69 The heart of their
theoretical claim is that international law lacks an enforcement mecha-
nism and, as a result, cannot have any relevance in a one-shot prisoner's
dilemma.7 0 This is clearly correct as a matter of theory, but it requires the
strong assumption that states interact in one-shot games.
If this assumption is relaxed, the case against CIL, or any other form
of international law, becomes much more tenuous. Critics of CIL must
retreat to weaker and more conditional arguments. In their book, The
Limits of International Law, Goldsmith and Posner71 state that a behav-
ioral regularity can, in theory, emerge from a prisoner's dilemma and
that this "approaches the traditional conception of customary interna-
tional law."72 They then write:
Although most international law scholars acknowledge that
States are more likely to violate customary international law as
the costs of compliance increase, they insist that the sense of le-
gal obligation puts some drag on such deviations. Our theory, by
contrast, insists that the payoffs from cooperation or deviation
are the sole determinants of whether States engage in the coop-
erative behaviors that are labeled as customary international law.
67. For a more complete version of the traditional criticism, see D'AMATO, supra note
2; see also Goldsmith & Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, supra note 5, at
1114, 1116 ("[CIL] lacks a centralized lawmaker, a centralized executive enforcer, and a cen-
tralized authoritative decision maker .... The origins of CIL are not understood.").
68. See supra note 5.
69. See Goldsmith & Posner, Understanding the Resemblance Between Modern and
Traditional Customary International Law, supra note 5, at 641 ("The faulty premise is that
CIL... influences national behavior."); Goldsmith & Posner, A Theory of Customary Interna-
tional Law, supra note 5, at 1177 (".... CIL has real content but is much less robust than
traditional scholars think, and it operates in a different fashion.").
70. Goldsmith & Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, supra note 5, at
1120-31.
71. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 5, at 43.
72. Id.
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This is why we deny the claim that customary international law
is an exogenous influence on States' behavior.73
The authors' recognition of the fact that behavioral regularities can
emerge in a prisoner's dilemma and that these regularities can affect the
payoffs of states requires the further conclusion that these norms can
affect state behavior. Accordingly, cooperation can emerge in a repeated
prisoner's dilemma as a result of these norms. If this is true, the state-
ment that CIL has no exogenous influence on behavior must mean that
although some norms come to be called CIL, that label has no impact on
behavior. The only difference between "mere" norms and "legal" norms
in this theory is the name. According to Goldsmith and Posner, there is
no meaningful sense in which a norm has greater force because it is con-
74
sidered a legal norm.
As will be discussed throughout much of this Article, however, there
is no valid theoretical reason to conclude that state payoffs are unaf-
fected when a norm comes to be regarded as a legal requirement.
Commentators advance two other important arguments to challenge
the existence of CIL. The first is the claim that a state's reputation for
compliance with international law cannot have much effect on its behav-
ior. 75 This claim deserves a detailed discussion, which I provide in Part
111.76 The final critical claim is that the number of states is too large to
support significant cooperation. This claim is likely overstated and is
certainly not demonstrated in any existing writings.77 The simplest rea-
son for believing cooperation is possible is that although the number of
states in the world is relatively large-in the neighborhood of 200--for
73. Id. at 39.
74. It is helpful to be clear about the semantics involved here. Goldsmith and Posner
conclude that CIL has no influence on state behavior. One might describe this as a conclusion
that CIL "does not exist," though they refrain from using that terminology. To the extent they
state that CIL "exists," they are simply referring to the fact that certain norms are labeled as
CIL. In their view, however, norms described in this way do not impact behavior any differ-
ently than other norms. My own use of the terminology is somewhat different. As stated in the
Introduction and repeated in Part III, I define a rule of CIL as a rule that has some impact on
the payoffs of states. So, using the Goldsmith and Posner terminology, my claim is that CIL
can have an exogenous impact on behavior. Though either terminology can be used, I have
chosen my own because it avoids confusion between the question of whether a rule of CIL
"exists" and whether it affects payoffs.
75. Goldsmith & Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, supra note 5, at
1135.
76. See infra note 106 and accompanying text. For a more complete discussion of how
reputational concerns can generate compliance in international law, see Guzman, supra note
10.
77. See George Norman & Joel Trachtman, The Customary International Law Game,
99 AM. J. INT'L L. 541 (2005) (providing a careful and useful explanation of why cooperation
can arise in the international context despite the relatively large number of states).
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practical purposes the relevant number is normally much smaller, and at
times may be as small as two.
78
Under the approach advanced in this Article, a state is subject to a
rule of CIL if other states believe such a rule exists. Each state can come
to its own conclusion about whether a rule applies, and no coordination
among them is required. Though there may be widespread agreement
among states in some instances, this is not necessary for there to be a
relevant rule. If even a single state believes that a rule applies, that state's
interaction with an offending state may be affected by the violation. A
violation of a rule of CIL, then, may generate costs within a group as
small as two states.79 As a semantic matter, existing discussions of CIL
label a norm "special custom" when the number of states involved is too
small for it to qualify as general custom. Whatever the label, however,
these expectations generate incentives for states and, therefore, a form of
CIL.
Even when a general rule of CIL is present, there is no need for mul-
tilateral cooperation in the sanctioning of violations. When a state
violates international law, there is generally no expectation that all states
will band together to punish the violator.80 Rather, states affected by the
violation may choose to take some sort of retaliatory action. Direct sanc-
tions, then, are applied bilaterally rather than multilaterally, making them
possible even when there are many states involved and no explicit coor-
dination.
Furthermore, under the model of CIL advanced in this Article, repu-
tational sanctions can affect violators without formal action by other
states. This reputational effect generates a reaction from all states with-
out requiring any form of costly action on their part.81 There is, therefore,
a form of multilateral consequence without the need for multilateral co-
ordination.
Once the assumption of a one-shot game is abandoned' in favor of
the more realistic assumption of a repeated game, conclusions about the
importance of custom are speculative. As a matter of theory, then, CIL
may be effective. To dismiss this source of law, therefore, requires em-
pirical evidence showing that it is irrelevant. To the best of my
78. See Oscar Schacter, New Custom: Power, Opinio Juris, and Contrary Practice, in
THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AT THE THRESHOLD OF THE 21ST CENTURY: ESSAYS IN
HONOR OF KRZYSZTOF SKUBISZEWSKI 531, 536 (Jerzy Makarcyk ed., 1996) ("[T]he great
body of CIL was made by remarkably few states.").
79. See Verdier, supra note 10, at 863.
80. See Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 16, at 43 (laying out rules with respect to coun-
termeasures and making clear that such countermeasures can be taken bilaterally).
81. For a further discussion of this reputational effect, see infra Part III.
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knowledge, there is no empirical evidence on the importance of CIL, and
neither side in the debate should claim otherwise. Both sides marshal
anecdotal evidence in their favor, but there is as yet no persuasive study
of the impact of CIL on state behavior. With neither a theoretical argu-
ment nor empirical evidence to the effect that CIL does not matter, the
12
dismissal of CIL is simply an unsupported assertion.
III. CIL WITH RATIONAL STATES
If traditional notions of CIL are deeply flawed and the modem skep-
tics' claims are unpersuasive, we are left with a challenge. Legal scholars
must reconsider CIL to determine what a proper theory of CIL should
look like and whether there is a role for this source of law.3 To date, there
have been a modest number of articles attempting to provide a rationalist
model of CIL.' These articles establish beyond any serious doubt that CIL
can be present when states interact repeatedly over time.85 This Article is
the first, however, to offer a systematic reconstruction and evaluation of
CIL that is consistent with the assumption of a rational state.
The theoretical approach used in this Article is unabashedly institu-
tionalist, and like many other rational choice approaches, it uses game
theoretic models to describe state behavior. 6 It makes standard assump-
tions: states are capable of pursuing their interests, unwilling to take
82. See Andrew T. Guzman, The Promise of International Law, forthcoming VA. L.
REV. (2006) (reviewing JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW (2005)).
83. There is also an empirical challenge, beyond the scope of this paper, to evaluate the
effectiveness of CIL in affecting state behavior. This empirical challenge has only recently
been taken up with respect to treaty commitments, and hopefully CIL will follow. See Oona
Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 11l YALE L.J. 1935 (2002); Beth
A. Simmons, Money and the Law: Why Comply with the Public International Law of Money?,
25 YALE J. INT'L L. 323 (2000).
84. See Chinen, supra note 4, at 143; Guzman, supra note 10, at 1874-78; Norman &
Trachtman, supra note 77; Swaine, supra note 6; Verdier, supra note 10, at 839; Fon & Parisi,
Customary Law and Articulation Theories, supra note 10; Fon & Parisi, Stability and Change
in International Customary Law, supra note 10; Parisi, supra note 10.
85. I demonstrated this in my paper, Guzman, supra note 10, at 1844-51, 1874-78
("CIL may influence state behavior through both reputational and direct sanctions."). A more
thorough treatment can be found in Norman & Trachtman, supra note 77, at 568 ("[I]t is im-
possible to say with certainty that CIL affects behavior, how often, or how much. But it is
equally impossible to say that it does not affect behavior, that it seldom does so, or even that it
only has marginal effects.").
86. The tools of game theory are relatively new in international law, but they have
quickly become mainstream. For comprehensive presentations of game theory, see DOUGLAS
G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW (1994); DREw FUDENBERG & JEAN TIROLE,
GAME THEORY (1991); ERIC RASMUSSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO
GAME THEORY (1989).
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actions for any reason other than their own interests, and capable of under-
standing the consequences of their actions. 7 As in nearly all scholarship
aimed at describing international law and how it affects state behavior, I
treat the state as a single actor.88 The most important theoretical ap-
proaches put to one side by these assumptions are a public choice
approach and its close cousin, the liberal approach, both of which disag-
gregate the state and study the interplay of various interest groups within
it.89 The problem with these approaches is familiar-the complex interac-
tion of domestic interest groups makes it virtually impossible to develop a
predictive model of state behavior.9° A more detailed explanation and justi-
fication of the rational choice approach would be possible but not
productive. The merits and demerits of these and other approaches have
been catalogued exhaustively in many places, and I have provided my own
views on the matter elsewhere. 91 ,
Within a rational choice framework, one can imagine a variety of
ways to model the interaction of states, and recent writers have provided
a laundry list of games with which to study CIL.92 In each of these
87. Other approaches are possible, of course, though the institutionalist or rational actor
methodology used here is dominant in current writing on the theory of international law. For a
review of other approaches see Kenneth W. Abbott, Modem International Relations Theory: A
Prospectus for International Lawyers, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 335 (1989); Guzman, supra note
10, at 1830-40; Hathaway, supra note 83.
88. The theory advanced herein can be reconciled with a variety of public choice ap-
proaches. All that is assumed here is that states can identify their objectives and pursue them
at the international level. The theory and results are not affected by an assumption that those
objectives are the product of a struggle among interest groups. For a discussion of how public
choice issues can be handled in international legal scholarship, see Andrew T. Guzman,
Choice of Law: New Foundations, 90 GEO. L.J. 883, 900-04 (2002).
89. See Anne-Marie Burley, Law Among Liberal States: Liberal Internationalism and
the Act of State Doctrine, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1907 (1992); Andrew Moravcsik, Taking Pref-
erences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics, 51 INT'L ORG. 513 (1997); see
also Rachel Brewster, Rule-Based Dispute Resolution in International Law, VA. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2006); Kal Raustiala, Domestic Politics and International Regulatory Coopera-
tion, 49 WORLD POL. 482 (1997); supra notes 32-34.
90. See Abbott, supra note 87.
91. See Guzman, supra note 10, at 1830-40.
92. These include, for example, coordination games, hawk/dove games, and coercion.
See Swaine, supra note 6. In coordination games the players are indifferent between two or
more outcomes, but must coordinate their actions to avoid other, less desirable results. For
example, the navies of two states may wish to undertake training exercises in international
waters. Several possible areas of the ocean are available, and the countries are indifferent
about where their navies will train. Both countries, however, want to avoid a situation in which
both navies train in the same waters at the same time. The states' interests are consistent with
one another, but coordination is important to ensure the highest possible payoff. See Barbara
Koremenos, Charles Lipson, & Duncan Snidal, The Rational Design of International Institu-
tions, 55 INT'L ORG. 761, 774 (2001) (discussing coordination games in the context of
international relations); Duncan Snidal, Coordination versus Prisoner's Dilemma: Implica-
tions for International Cooperation and Regime, 79 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 923 (1985) (same). In
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games, CIL has the potential to alter payoffs and, therefore, to make a
difference in the interactions of states. The dominant model, however,
has been the prisoner's dilemma, and this Article focuses on that game.
Concentrating on the prisoner's dilemma is useful for an account, such
as the one presented here, that is fundamentally supportive of CIL. In the
prisoner's dilemma the interests of states are at odds, making a coopera-
tive outcome particularly difficult to achieve. In this sense, the prisoner's
dilemma is the hardest case for CIL. If cooperation is possible in this
context, it is likely possible in a wide range of games and strategic inter-
actions. Furthermore, the way in which rules of CIL might influence
payoffs is the same in any game, so the analysis presented here can eas-
ily be applied to other games.
It is important at this point to restate what I mean when I talk about
rules of CIL. A rule of CIL, for present purposes, is a legal rule that, by
virtue of its status, affects the payoffs of states. Traditional writing on
CIL defines the relevant rules doctrinally-a rule that satisfies the opinio
juris and practice requirements is a rule of CIL. This definition, however,
tells us nothing about state behavior. In a world of rational states, CIL is
relevant only when it has some impact on payoffs. Given that the rules in
question arise without explicit agreement, it seems sensible to limit the
definition to legal rules that have some effect.93
A. Prerequisites for Cooperation
The strongest claims about the irrelevance of CIL are typically based
on a simple one-shot prisoner's dilemma. In these models, the claim that
CIL does not matter follows from the basic structure of the game-in a
one-shot prisoner's dilemma, the parties have no reason to cooperate. In
a hawk/dove game each player prefers to play one strategy, often called "hawk," but only if the
other player plays a different strategy, "dove." For example, returning to the above example, in
a hawk/dove game, both parties would prefer to train in one area, but would rather train by
themselves rather than share that area. We can again reach an equilibrium through coordina-
tion-once one state commits to train in the preferred area, the other state will choose a
different area. There is more tension between the states' objectives here than in a coordination
game, but once again we can achieve a stable equilibrium through communication and coordi-
nation and without international law. For a development of the hawk/dove game in the
international law context, see Tom Ginsburg & Richard H. McAdams, Adjudicating in Anar-
chy: An Expressive Theory of International Dispute Resolution, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1229 (2004).
93. I recognize that "law" is not generally defined as being limited to rules that affects
costs and benefits. With respect to CIL, however, we are without the conventional markers for
what is and what is not law (the passage of legislation, the signing of a treaty, the adoption of
administrative rules, etc.). Where one turns instead is an open question. I do not wish to make
any general point about the meaning of "law." Defining CIL to be those customary legal rules
that affect behavior is simply the most practical definition for the development of this Article.
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the domestic setting, this sort of problem can be resolved through con-
tract; two parties can enter into a binding commitment, and if one of
them breaches the contract, the other is entitled to damages ordered and
enforced by courts. The threat of liability encourages compliance and,
therefore, cooperation. The ability to use binding contracts changes the
game from a one-shot game to a two period game, in which those who
breach in the first period must pay damages in the second period.
The international system, however, does not provide for binding con-
tracts or a set of courts ready to resolve interstate disputes. 9 Since
violations of CIL do not lead to court-imposed sanctions, law can only
affect behavior if there is some other sanction associated with noncom-
pliance.
The two sanctions of greatest interest can be labeled direct sanctions
and reputational sanctions.95 Direct sanctions are specific punishments
meted out by other states in response to a violation. For example, if a
state violates a CIL obligation, an affected state might respond by refus-
ing to perform some obligation it owes to the offending state.96 These
direct sanctions can deter wrongdoing, but their use is hampered by a
number of considerations. First, direct sanctions are often costly to the
sanctioning state. For example, the boycott of trade with South Africa
during the apartheid years was certainly burdensome to South Africa, but
it was also costly to the implementing countries whose exporters lost a
market and whose consumers were unable to purchase South African
goods.97 This cost makes it less likely that states will punish a violation
and, therefore, reduces the incentive generated by the threat of a sanc-
tion.
Second, direct sanctions for violations of CIL are normally imposed
unilaterally and without formal dispute resolution procedures. As a re-
sult, there is no guarantee that sanctions will be imposed against actual
violators rather than states that are in compliance. If violators are not
always sanctioned and non-violators sometimes face sanctions, the in-
centive effect of sanctions is once again reduced because of the
94. There is, of course, the ICJ, which is at times used to resolve disputes, but that
institution hears very few cases and lacks enforcement powers.
95. For a detailed discussion of compliance in international law, including the role of
reputational sanctions, see Guzman, supra note 10.
96. See, e.g., Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful
Acts, supra note 16, art. 49 ("Countermeasures are limited to the non-performance ... of
international obligations of the State taking the measures towards the responsible State.").
97. See G.A. Res. 1761, U.N. Doc. A/RES/1761 (XVII) (Nov. 7, 1962) (calling for
member states to break all diplomatic ties with South Africa, forbid their ships from entering
her ports, boycott all South African goods and cease exporting to her, and refuse landing rights
to South African aircraft).
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diminished difference in treatment between those that comply and those
that do not.
The use of direct sanctions is sufficiently hampered in practice that
even the strongest believers in international law must concede that they
normally provide no more than a modest incentive toward compliance
with CIL.98 Because states interact repeatedly, however, another form of
costs-reputational sanctions-is able to increase the "compliance pull"
of international law.
Reputational sanctions give states a separate reason to comply with
the rules of international law in general and CIL in particular. A refusal
to comply with international obligations today signals to other countries
a willingness to violate the law. Other states then use this information to
decide how to interact with the violating state in the future. For example,
if state A repeatedly refuses to comply with a rule of CIL, it damages its
reputation as a state that respects international legal rules. This in turn
will hurt the state's future international interactions. Other states may be
reluctant to comply with CIL in their dealings with this state, and they
may take actions to protect against future violations. If the reputational
harm affects expectations about compliance with international agree-
ments, it will also be more difficult for the violating state to enter into
such agreements in the future.
To see how reputation can affect behavior, think of states deciding
whether or not to comply with an existing rule of CIL. Suppose, for ex-
ample, that states face a situation that, putting aside the relevant CIL
rule, is a prisoner's dilemma in which we label the cooperative outcome
"comply" and the non-cooperative outcome "violate," as shown in Fig-
ure 1.99 Suppose, for example, that states must decide whether or not to






Violate 6, 2 3, 3
98. See Guzman, supra note 10, at 1845. But see Lori Fisler Damrosch, Enforcing In-
ternational Law Through Non-Forcible Measures, 269 RECUEIL DES COURS 9, 19-22 (1997)
(describing a range of enforcement mechanisms in international law).
99. This example is taken from Guzman, supra note 10, at 1842-5 1.
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Because this is a repeated game, it is necessary to specify the out-
come of future rounds. Absent a relevant rule of CIL, it is assumed that
the identical game is repeated indefinitely and the parties treat every in-
teraction as a separate one-shot game. The result is that the parties both
play "violate" in every period. Assuming a discount rate of r, the states
each earn a payoff of: 3 + 3/(1+r) + 3/(l+r)2 + . = 3(1+r)/r.' °° To sim-
plify, let R = (l+r)/r. Then each country receives a payoff of 3R.
Now consider how CIL might alter this result. Suppose that it is pos-
sible for a state to have a "good" reputation for following CIL, which
simply means that other states believe that the state complies with CIL.' ° '
In concrete terms, assume that as long as a state complies with a particu-
lar rule of CIL, other states expect it to continue to do so. Once the state
violates the rule, however, all other states consider it to have a "bad"
reputation and will anticipate violations in the future. 02 If two states with
good reputations interact, each will earn a payoff of 5 in every period as
long as both comply. If a state violates in the first period, it earns a pay-
off of 6 in that period, but for every subsequent period it earns a payoff
of 3 because it has lost its good reputation and other states anticipate a
violation. So each country faces the following payoffs:
If it complies: 5 + 5/(l+r) + 5/(l+r)2 +... = 5(l+r)/r = 5R
If it violates: 6 + 3/(1+r) + 3/(l+r)2 + ... 3 + 3(l+r)/r = 3 + 3R




Country 1 Comply 5R, 5R 3R-1, 3+3R
Violate 3+3R, 3R-1 3R, 3R
The key point is that Figure II may no longer be a prisoner's di-
lemma. For sufficiently large values of R (meaning a sufficiently low
discount rate, r) both states have an incentive to comply. For example, if
100. The calculation of these payoffs is straightforward once it is recognized that: x +
x/(1+r) + x/(1+r)2 +... = x(l+r)/r.
101. I put aside for the moment the possibility that the content of CIL may be uncertain
or subject to dispute.
102. The simple identification of countries as having a "good" or "bad" reputation is
done for the sake of clarity. It is not necessary for the analysis. All that is required is that repu-
tation varies along a spectrum and that violations of CIL harm a country's reputation.
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the discount rate is assumed to be .25 (meaning that a state is indifferent
between a payoff of 1 today and 1.25 next period), then R = 5 and the
dominant strategy for both parties is to comply with the rule of CIL. 103
In this illustration, the CIL rule has altered behavior. Because viola-
tion of the rule affects a state's reputation for compliance, it is costly.
There remains a current payoff to violation, but there are also future
costs brought on by the CIL rule. The presence of a rule of CIL, then,
generates an incentive for compliance because a reputation for compli-
ance with CIL (or any international law, for that matter) offers benefits to
a state. To establish or preserve such a reputation and enjoy gains in the
future, a state may be willing to forego a short term benefit.
Notice that the nature of the reputational sanction presented above is
not dependent on the explicit and intentional application of direct sanc-
tions. When a state violates CIL, the resulting reputational sanction is
not a costly punishment imposed by other states.' ° Rather, it is an updat-
ing of the beliefs about the violating state. Thus, for example, if the
United States fails to respect the diplomatic immunity of a foreign dip-
lomat, other states (including but not limited to the state of the diplomat)
will take note of this action and alter their expectations about the immu-
nity that will be granted in the future. This may change the way in which
other states conduct their diplomatic relations with the United States, the
way they treat American diplomats, and their willingness to rely on U.S.
legal behavior. Though these changes impose costs on the United States,
they are not costly to the other states. Rather, the sanction is the product
of every other state altering its beliefs about the United States and then
maximizing its payoffs under those new beliefs. So a state may decide,
for example, to close or reduce the size of its diplomatic mission. This
action would not be taken to punish the United States (though it would
have that effect) but rather would reflect new fears for the safety of dip-
lomats.
B. The Value of Reputation
A theory of compliance based on reputation can only work if states
care about their reputation,' 5 and commentators seem to agree that repu-
tation is in fact an important consideration for states. Even those most
103. The payoff from compliance is 25 and the payoff from violation, even if the other
party does not violate in the first period, is 18.
104. See Andrew T. Guzman, The Design of InternationalAgreements, 16 Eur. J. Int'l L.
579 (2005).
105. For a more detailed discussion of reputation, see George W. Downs & Michael A.
Jones, Reputation, Compliance, and International Law, 31 J. LEG. STUD. 95 (2002); Guzman,
supra note 10.
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skeptical of CIL grudgingly admit that states put some weight on reputa-
tional concerns. Goldsmith and Posner, for example, state that "all things
equal, nations will strive to have a reputation for compliance with inter-
national law, but a reputation for compliance will not always be of
paramount concern because all things are not equal." 10 6 Of course, any
sensible theory of law must acknowledge that other interests and con-
cerns may override the incentives created by law. States are less likely to
abide by international law when their security is at stake, for example.
More generally, the most basic assumption of any rational choice model
is that states will comply with international law when the total benefits
of doing so outweigh the costs. It follows that reputational concerns are
not always paramount.
A reputational theory of CIL, however, does not require that reputa-
tion dominate all other concerns. It requires only that states care about
their reputation. If this is so, international law (customary or otherwise)
offers some "compliance pull," encouraging states to obey the law. A
state will not violate a norm of CIL if that violation would generate
gains smaller than its costs. The reputational cost must be added to
whatever other costs are relevant-putting a thumb on the scale in favor
of compliance.
Furthermore, the notion that states wish to preserve a reputation for
compliance with international law does not imply that this is the only
reputational issue of concern to them. States may, for example, value a
reputation for toughness in international relations, and this may at times
conflict with the desire for a reputation for compliance with international
law.10 7 In this and other contexts, a state may be prepared to sacrifice its
reputation for compliance in order to achieve other goals. The only claim
of the reputational theory of compliance is that such a sacrifice is costly
to the state.
It should also be noted that a state's reputation in one area may be
different from its reputation in another. For example, a state may be reli-
able with respect to economic cooperation but not with respect to human
rights issues. The extent to which states have a general reputation for
compliance with international law as opposed to separate reputations for
each issue area is significant, but goes beyond the scope of this Article
and so will be left for another day.1
0 8
106. See. e.g., Goldsmith & Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, supra
note 5, at 1136.
107. See, e.g., Robert 0. Keohane, International Relations and International Law: Two
Optics, 38 HARV. INT'L L.J. 487, 496-99 (1997).
108. See Downs & Jones, supra note 105.
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The point here is that a reputation for compliance is valuable to
states; however, this observation should not be mistaken for a claim that
it trumps all other considerations or all other forms of reputation. At-
tempts to dismiss a reputational theory on the grounds that other forces
are at work in a state's decisions misunderstand what it means for repu-
tation to matter. If the desire for a reputation for compliance causes
states, at the margin, to comply with international law more than they
otherwise would, a reputational theory is relevant.
C. International Norms and the Definition of CIL
At this point it is helpful to clarify what it means for a particular be-
havioral regularity to be a rule of CIL rather than merely a norm of
behavior. This distinction is a problematic one throughout the literature
on CIL. A central problem for this Article is that the most plausible
mechanism through which norms operate is quite similar to the way in
which CIL operates. In both cases, certain behaviors are considered to be
"cooperative," and a failure to act accordingly will generate a negative
signal. It is inevitable, then, that the line between norms and CIL will
often be difficult to identify.
Recognizing the similarity between CIL and norms suggests two
possible definitions for CIL. First, one could define CIL to simply be
those behavioral norms that have a particularly strong impact on state
behavior. That is, we could assign the label of CIL to a set of particularly
powerful norms. This definition, however, would not distinguish cases in
which a norm gained greater force because it came to be seen as a rule
of CIL. The term CIL would simply describe a certain set of norms.
An alternative definition of CIL-and the one chosen for this Arti-
cle-refers to those norms that states see as legal rules. A norm may
come to be seen as a legal obligation, for example, if it is considered es-
pecially important and of a higher order than "mere" norms. Or a norm
may attain the status of CIL because it has been in place for a long time
and has come to be viewed as more fundamental to the system than other
norms. Once the norm becomes a legal rule, states have a heightened
expectation of compliance. With this heightened expectation of compli-
ance comes an increase in reputational sanctions in the event of a
violation. It is one thing to violate a "mere" norm, but it is more serious
to violate a rule of CIL. All else equal, the latter represents a more seri-
ous failure to cooperate and, accordingly, will have a more significant
impact on a state's reputation. This higher cost, in turn, increases the
"compliance pull" of the rule. This definition of CIL is functional and
contrasts with the doctrinal view in the existing literature.
Fall 20051
Michigan Journal of International Law
Notice that the definition turns on the beliefs of states and not their
public statements. That is, a rule of CIL exists only if states have an hon-
est belief that a particular norm is a legal rule. The reputational
consequence of violation comes about because states that observe a vio-
lation then update their beliefs. To illustrate, it is not enough for the
United States to declare that there is a legal obligation to refrain from
expropriating the property of foreign investors. The United States must
believe it to be so and must view a failure to behave accordingly as a
signal about the willingness of another state to comply with international
obligations.
It should also be noted that states are not free to choose their own
beliefs. Beliefs are not policy variables that a state is able to manipulate
strategically. This is true both with respect to the status of legal rules (a
state cannot "choose" to believe that a legal rule does or does not exist)
and with respect to the beliefs of a state about the reputation of other
states (a state cannot "choose" to believe that a state is likely or unlikely
to comply with a rule of CIL). Because states are not "choosing" their
beliefs, the theory of CIL advanced here does not imply that states can
create a rule of CIL simply by wishing that it exists.
IV. A POSITIVE THEORY OF CIL
Considering CIL through a reputational lens allows us to develop an
understanding of how CIL can exist in a model of rational states. This
Part focuses on a positive explanation of how CIL can exist and the im-
plications for existing views of CIL. Specifically, it considers how a
reputational theory can explain the presence of CIL and the implications
of that theory for opinio juris and state practice, the traditional touch-
stones of CIL. It also examines what a reputational theory implies for the
possible existence and importance of "instant custom" and "special cus-
tom." In Part V, the Article turns to a more normative discussion of some
other areas of CIL doctrine. The distinction between normative and posi-
tive analysis is inevitably imperfect in the sense that some normative
discussion has unavoidably entered this Part and some positive discus-
sion is present in the normative section. In general, however, this Part is
focused on what the theory means for existing understandings of CIL,
while the normative section is interested in the desirability of certain
doctrinal rules of CIL.
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A. Opinio Juris
1. The Existing Doctrine of Opinio Juris
At present, opinio juris, also known as the "subjective element" of
CIL, is one of the two requirements for the existence of a rule of CIL.
The standard formulation of opinio juris is that a practice must be "ac-
cepted as law."' 9 The precise contours of opinio juris are somewhat
uncertain," ° but most agree that some version of it is required."'
To understand this requirement, it is helpful to go back to basic no-
tions of the relationship between international law and consent."2 It is
commonly observed that international law cannot bind states without
their consent, and notions of consent are often said to be the basis for
CIL."3 If this is true, it obviously follows that CIL binds a state only if
that particular state accepts that the rule of CIL is a binding obliga-
tion." 4 If one holds to the touchstone of consent, then, opinio juris
109. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, para. 1 (b).
110. See, e.g., Int'l L. Ass'n, Comm. on Formation of Customary (Gen.) Int'l L., State-
ment of Principles Applicable to the Formation of General Customary International Law 29-
30 (2000), available at http://www.ila-hq.org/pdf/customarylaw.pdf [hereinafter ILA Report]
("The question of the subjective element in customary law is highly controversial .... 'The
precise definition of... the psychological element in the formation of custom, the philoso-
pher's stone which transmutes the inert mass of accumulated usage into the gold of binding
legal rules, has probably caused more academic controversy than all the actual contested
claims made by States on the basis of alleged custom.' ") (quoting H.W.A. THIRLWAY, INTER-
NATIONAL CUSTOMARY LAW AND CODIFICATION 47 (1972)).
Ill. See Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta), 1985 I.C.J. 13, 29 (June 3) ("[T]he material
of customary international law is to be looked for primarily in the actual practice and opinio
juris of States .... ); North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den., F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969
I.C.J. 3, 44 (Feb. 20) ("The States concerned must therefore feel that they are conforming to
what amounts to a legal obligation."); Roberts, supra note 7, at 757; see also BYERS, supra
note 2, at 18 ("Although most international lawyers agree that opinio juris plays a role in
transforming State practice into rules of customary international law, they have not been able
to agree on its character .... ").
112. In previous writing I have criticized the consent-based approach to international
law. See Guzman, supra note 10, at 1833-34.
113. See, e.g., S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9, at 18 (Sept. 7) ("The
rules of law binding upon States therefore emanate from their own free will..."); Louis Hen-
kin, International Law: Politics, Values and Functions, 216 RECUEIL DES COURS
D'ACADEMIES DE DROIT INT'L 9, 27 (1989) ("[A] state is not subject to any external authority
unless it has voluntarily consented to such authority.").
114. In the debates about opiniojuris there are some who favor a requirement that states
believe that a rule exists while others favor a rule requiring that states consent to the rule of
CIL. See Maurice H. Mendelson, The Formation of Customary International Law, 272 RE-
CUEIL DES COURS 155, 246 (1998) ("Some... find the explanation in consent .... Others find
the basis of custom's binding force in States' belief in the legal necessity or permissibility of
the practice in question-which I shall call for short the 'belief' [approach]."). This distinction
can matter in some discussions, but for present purposes it is sufficient to focus on whether a
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requires that there be both a general acceptance in the international
community that a rule of CIL exists and an acceptance by the affected
state.
This conclusion, however, is not the mainstream view."' Though
many commentaries fail to clearly distinguish the opinio juris required
of states as a group from that required of an individual state, most dis-
cussions require only the former."6 The ICJ, for its part, does not
clearly identify which states must possess the psychological element
that is opinio juris, but it seems to have in mind states as a group. For
example, in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, the ICJ stated that
"[t]he States concerned must therefore feel that they are conforming to
what amounts to a legal obligation.""' 7 Though not entirely clear, the
reference to "the States concerned" suggests a group of affected states
rather than simply the violating state. "'
The persistent objector doctrine also suggests that the sense of le-
gal obligation must be held by states in general and not just the
defendant state in particular." 9 According to that doctrine, a state that
does not share the community's sense that a particular norm is a rule of
CIL cannot, based on that fact alone, claim to be exempt from the rule.
Rather, the state must make its objections widely known, must do so
state has accepted the existence of a rule of CIL-a terminology that (at least partially) recon-
ciles the two above alternatives. See id. at 283; ILA Report, supra note 110, at 30, cmt. 3.
115. See, e.g., Jonathan I. Chamey, The Persistent Objector Rule and the Development of
Customary International Law, 56 BRIT. YB. INT'L L. 1, 16 (1985) ("Most writers forbear
from claiming that consent is the basis for obligation under international law .... ")
116. See, e.g., Mendelson, supra note 114, at 248 ("[E]ven if we were to accept ... that
the consent of the generality of States is needed before a customary rule comes into being, it
by no means follows that, for a particular State to be bound by that rule, one must show that
that particular State consented to it."); see also infra notes 137-149.
117. North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den., F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 44
(Feb. 20).
118. Subsequent discussion in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases is consistent with
this conclusion. The ICJ spoke of the parties to the case and states in general without any
particular focus on the defendant state:
[S]ome States have at first probably accepted the rules in question, as States usually
do, because they found them convenient and useful, the best possible solution for
the problems involved. Others may also have been convinced that the instrument
elaborated ... was to become and would in due course become general law ....
Many States have followed suit under the conviction that it was law .... [T]he gen-
eral practice of States should be recognized as prima facie evidence that it is
accepted as law.
Id. [ 78.
119. See infra note 125 for a discussion of the persistent objector doctrine.
[Vol. 27:115
Saving Customary International Law
before the practice solidifies into a rule of CIL,'20 and must make the
objection on a consistent basis. 2 ' If CIL required that an individual
state feel a legal obligation to comply with a rule, there would be no
need for the persistent objector doctrine as it currently stands. For ex-
ample, it would not be necessary for a state to show that it had objected
to a norm prior to that norm becoming law. Instead, it would be suffi-
cient to show that a state had not consented to or accepted the rule. The
state would then simply not be bound.1
22
For many international law scholars, the notion of consent is so
deeply engrained that the idea of being bound by CIL without consent
is troubling. One way around this problem has been to reference "in-
ferred consent."' 23 If a state fails to object to a developing rule, then this
failure to object is taken as support for the rule.
The notion of inferred consent attempts to retain the consensual
basis of international law despite the absence of explicit consent. Not-
withstanding its focus on consent, however, it requires that states
object even (and perhaps especially) if they are behaving consistently
with the norm but do not do so out of a sense of legal obligation. As
Byers points out, a lack of objection is quite different from consent.
A state may fail to object for any number of reasons having nothing to
do with consent. It may prefer to avoid objecting for political reasons,
it may not feel that the norm is changing into custom-making objec-
tion unnecessary-or it may simply not be sufficiently affected by the
rule to make objection a priority. The inferred consent argument, then,
120. See T.L. Stein, The Approach of the Different Drummer: The Principle of the Per-
sistent Objector in International Law, 26 HARV. J. INT'L L. 457, 458 (1985).
121. Jonathan Chamey claims that the persistent objector rule implies that the consent
theory is correct, but what his argument actually shows is that states can avoid the application
of the law, not that they must explicitly consent in order to be bound. That is, he is correct to
note that the persistent objector rule allows states to opt-out of CIL, but this is not the same as
a consent theory under which a state must opt-in in order to be bound. See Chamey, supra
note 115, at 16 ("It is difficult to see how the acceptance of [the persistent objector] rule does
not reflect an acceptance of the consent theory of international law. If a mere objection to an
evolving rule of law can prevent application of that rule to the State, then each State has the
unilateral power to decide whether or not to be bound by the rule.")
122. There would surely remain evidentiary issues about whether the state agreed that it
had a legal obligation, but this evidentiary issue may at times be met without widespread
knowledge of the objection by other states. Furthermore, because most CIL violations are not
subject to any sort of dispute resolution, the issue seems minor. At any rate, given that the
underlying opinio juris requirement does not demand that the sense of legal obligation be
"widely known," it is hard to see why it would make sense to demand this of an objector if the
goal was to identify consent.
123. See BYERS, supra note 2, at 142-46; MARK VILLIGER, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND TREATIES 18-22 (1985).
124. See BYERS, supra note 2, at 143.
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should be recognized as an argument that a state does not have to share
a sense of legal obligation to be obligated. It is enough that it has failed
to object to a rule of CIL supported by a general sense of legal obliga-
tion among states.'
25
Other scholars have attempted to rescue the consent element by ar-
guing that states have consented to "secondary" rules of CIL.'26 The
notion here is that states have consented to the way in which rules of
CIL change over time, including a rule under which CIL can arise or
change without affirmative consent. In the words of D'Amato, "per-
haps the most important secondary rule in international law is the
secondary rule of custom."'27 D'Amato describes what he terms an "in-
ternational consensus" with respect to this secondary rule.'28 For
present purposes, what matters is that this notion of secondary rules
concedes that states can be bound by a particular rule without consent-
ing to it. To say that some other, secondary consent requirement is
nonetheless satisfied calls on a different notion of consent.
29
Ultimately, it is clear that the actual consent of an affected state is
not itself required for that state to be bound by a particular rule of
CIL.3 ° Whether one simply accepts that consent is not necessary for a
rule of CIL to bind a state or one imagines that states have agreed to a
secondary rule under which there is a presumption of consent (rebut-
table through the persistent objector doctrine) makes little difference.
The key point is that states can be bound by CIL (or changes in CIL)
even if they themselves have not consented to the rule.
This conclusion is consistent with at least a substantial part of the
CIL literature-the opinio juris requirement is satisfied if states in gen-
125. The inferred consent approach has other flaws, including that it cannot explain why
new states are generally thought to be bound by rules of CIL despite the fact that we cannot
infer consent in their case. Similarly, it cannot easily be reconciled with the conventional rule
that objections brought after a rule is established are insufficient to avoid the binding force of
CIL. See Charney, supra note 115.
126. See Vaughan Lowe, Do General Rules of International Law Exist?, 9 REV. OF INT'L
STUDIES 207, 208-10 (1983).
127. D'AMATO, supra note 2, at 44.
128. Id. at42.
129. Though the argument in this Article does not require that this notion of secondary
consent be discarded, it is worth noting that it represents a curious idea of consent. The secon-
dary consent approach does not allege that any state ever actually gave explicit consent to a set
of secondary rules governing custom formation, let alone that all nations have done so. Nor is
there scope for a state to withdraw its consent to the secondary rules or even to withhold con-
sent when it first becomes a state. The claim, then, is that consenting to these secondary rules
is a necessary and unavoidable part of being a state. Labeling this "consent" is akin to suggest-
ing that humans have consented to breathing in oxygen and exhaling carbon dioxide.
130. See BYERS, supra note 2, at 142-46; Akehurst, supra note 4, at 23 ("A State can be
bound by a rule of customary international law even if it has never consented to that rule.").
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eral believe that a rule has the status of CIL. The distinction between
the views of the individual state whose actions are alleged to have vio-
lated CIL and the views of states in general is important because once
the narrower notion of consent is abandoned, CIL becomes a more co-
herent source of law. A rule of CIL is able to bind individual states that
have not consented to it and that do not feel a sense of legal obligation
if there is nonetheless a general sense of legal obligation among other
states.
One can find prominent commentators who take the view that
opiniojuris is not necessary for the formation of CIL.13' There is also a
more modest position that has found support in several ICJ cases and
that takes the presence of consistent state practice as sufficient to dem-
onstrate the existence of opinio juris.132 While this view offers lip
service to opinio juris, it largely eliminates it as a meaningful element
in the establishment of CIL.
These perspectives, however, do not appear to be majority views,
13
and it is not difficult to find ICJ cases that take opinio juris seriously,
including the case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in
and Against Nicaragua,'4 the North Sea Continental Shelf cases,'35 and
the Lotus case.136
131. See, e.g., H. LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT 380 (1958); Akehurst, supra note 4, at 32 ("The most radical ap-
proach is a denial of any requirement of opinio juris."); Mendelson, supra note 114, at 250,
289 ("[1]t is not in fact necessary to demonstrate the presence of the subjective element in all,
or perhaps even most, instances .... [W]here there is a well established practice, the Court
and other international tribunals, not to mention the States themselves, tend to conclude that
there is a customary rule without looking for proof of opinio juris.").
132. See, e.g., Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco (Fr. v.
U.S.), 1952 I.C.J. 176, 200 (Aug. 27) (reviewing diplomatic correspondence to determine that
a right to exercise consular jurisdiction "founded upon custom or usage" had not been estab-
lished); Asylum (Colom. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266, 276 (Nov. 20) (suggesting that a customary
rule must be based on a "constant and uniform usage").
133. See, e.g., Wolfke, supra note 42, at 40-41 ("Without practice (consuetudo), custom-
ary international law would obviously be a misnomer, since practice constitutes precisely the
main differentia specifica of that kind of international law. On the other hand, without the
subjective element of acceptance of the practice as law the difference between international
custom and simple regularity of conduct (usus) or other non-legal rules of conduct would
disappear.").
134. "[T]his opinio juris may be deduced from, inter alia, the attitude of the Parties and
of States towards certain General Assembly resolutions... "Military and Paramilitary Activi-
ties (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 188 (June 27).
135. In which the ICJ found that the claims of Denmark and the Netherlands regarding CIL
failed because neither the opiniojuris nor the practice requirements were met. North Sea Conti-
nental Shelf, (ER.G. v. Den., ER.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 229, 231 9H 74-78 (Feb. 20).
136. In this case, the PCIJ found that there was insufficient evidence of opiniojuris. S.S.
Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9, at 15-19 (Sept. 7) (finding that the opinio
juris requirement was not met).
Fall 2005]
Michigan Journal of International Law
If one accepts that opinio juris must be established, there remains
the question of how to do so. The central problem, of course, is that it is
difficult to know what a state believes. We observe only actions and
statements, not beliefs. State actions are more likely than statements to
reflect beliefs, but they are also less frequently on point. This raises the
question of whether statements can ever count as evidence of beliefs, or
if only actions count. Though there are myriad problems with using
statements as evidence of a state's beliefs,'37 the majority view is that
they may be used in this way. 138
2. A Rational Choice Analysis of Opinio Juris
A sensible and coherent theory of CIL must consider the behavior of
states and the relationship between a legal rule and state actions. If a rule
of CIL affects state behavior, it must be that it affects the payoffs states
receive. As already discussed, these payoffs can be affected through either
direct or reputational sanctions.'39 A theory of CIL, then, should take this
into account.
Imagine that a state is choosing between two actions. The first possi-
ble action, which we call "comply," is consistent with a relevant rule of
law. The second possible action, which we call "violate," is inconsistent
with the rule. If the state chooses "violate," it faces a reputational or direct
cost. Because these costs or sanctions depend on the actions and beliefs of
other states, they are only triggered if other states believe that there has
been a violation of a rule of international law. In other words, it is not the
beliefs of the acting state that matter. Rather, if the states it interacts with
believe there has been a violation of CIL, they will perceive the acting
state to be less willing to abide by the law, and this belief will negatively
affect future interactions. 40 These other states may also decide to impose
some form of direct sanction. Whatever its form, the sanction imposes a
cost on the violating state, and the threat of such direct and reputational
sanctions can provide an incentive toward compliance.
Understanding the behavior of states with respect to CIL sheds light
on a theoretically sound way to define opiniojuris.
Opinio juris refers to the beliefs of states that interact with a po-
tential violator. To the extent that these states believe there exists
a legal obligation, the potential violator faces a rule of CIL.
137. See supra Part II.
138. See supra note 134 (quoting an ICJ passage that treats votes on UN resolutions as
evidence of opiniojuris).
139. See supra Part III.
140. Id.
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Strictly speaking, even the notion that there must be a general sense
of legal obligation among states is incorrect. Each state has its own be-
liefs about the status of CIL and it is not necessary for all these views to
be the same. When a state takes action that an observing state believes to
be a violation of a legal rule, the latter adjusts its estimate of the acting
state's willingness to comply with international legal rules. Notice that
the sanction is bilateral in the sense that there is no need for a third party
state in the sanctioning process. On the other hand, the violative act may
affect some state other than the observing state. There is, after all, no
reason for a state to update its beliefs based only on its firsthand experi-
ences. If it observes a legal violation it will update its beliefs, even if the
violation did not cause it injury.
The claim that each state has its own beliefs about the status of CIL
must be tempered with recognition of the fact that a general sense of le-
gal obligation may well influence the perception of states. That is, a state
is more likely to believe that another state has a legal obligation if other
states have the same view. Thus, a strong sense of legal obligation is
more likely to come about if it is shared by a group of states. Further-
more, sanctions, whether direct or reputational, are more costly when
they are applied by many states. Putting aside the persistent objector ex-
ception (discussed below), 41 the role of consent is all but gone from this
description of CIL. Such an approach is sensible from the perspective of
state incentives because, as mentioned, changes in the beliefs of other
states generate reputational sanctions. Looking to states as a group is
also consistent with the language in Article 38 of the Statute of the 
ICJ,'42
language used by the ICJ in its decisions, 43 and language in the Restate-
ment (Third) of Foreign Relations Law.'"
Consent of the affected state is not required for the opinio ju-
ris requirement to be satisfied.
The role of consent is dismissed because consent does not generate
an incentive to comply with a rule of CIL. The beliefs of other states, in
141. See infra Part V.
142. "[I]ntemational custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law." Statute
of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1)(b).
143. See, e.g., S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9, at 18 (Sept. 7) (stat-
ing that the will of states can be expressed through "usages generally accepted as expressing
principles of law.")(emphasis added).
144. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES,
§ 102 cmt. c (1 987)("For a practice of states to become a rule of customary international law it
must appear that the states follow the practice from a sense of legal obligation .... A practice
initially followed by states as a matter of courtesy or habit may become law when states gen-
erally come to believe that they are under a legal obligation." (emphasis added).
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contrast, do generate such an incentive. A system that generates a legal
obligation only when there is explicit consent would, to be sure, be more
protective of state sovereignty and may (or may not) be a better norma-
tive system.'45 The point here, then, is not that consent should or should
not be a requirement, but rather that in a model of rational states, there is
no role for consent in the formation of CIL.
The focus on reputation and perception also explains the existence of
aggressive attempts to frame the way in which CIL is perceived. Human
rights activists, for example, have succeeded in bringing at least some
human rights under the CIL heading. Similar efforts are underway with
respect to a wide range of other norms some commentators would like to
see become rules of CIL. For example, some states and scholars argue
that torture is prohibited under CIL despite the fact that the practice is
still prevalent throughout the world.' 6 Others argue that environmental
protection is CIL, even without evidence of consistent and general prac-
tice. 47 In the investment area, there continues to be disagreement about
whether the duty to pay full compensation for expropriation
of foreign-owned property is a rule of CIL.'48 By influencing
perceptions, advocates may be able to alter the beliefs of states and,
therefore, influence CIL.'
49
B. The State Practice Requirement
The second element in most definitions of CIL is the requirement of
consistent state practice. Once again, however, if we penetrate the sur-
face of this element there is considerable disagreement among
commentators. In fact, virtually every part of the state practice inquiry is
the subject of debate. There is, for example, no consensus regarding the
145. For a discussion of the normative implications of CIL rule formation, see Eugene
Kontorovich, The Efficiency of International Customary Norms, draft manuscript on file with
author (2005).
146. See supra note 13.
147. Id.
148. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES, § 712 cmt. d (1987)(stating that states have a duty to pay full compensation for the
expropriation of foreign-owned property); see also Amoco Int'l Fin. Corp. v. Gov't of the
Islamic Rep. of Iran, 15 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 189, 223, 234 (1987). But see S. N. Guha
Roy, Is the Law of Responsibility of States For Injuries To Aliens a Part of Universal Interna-
tional Law?, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 863, 888-89 (1961); E. Jimenez de Arechaga, The Duty to
Compensate for the Nationalization of Foreign Property, 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 237, 239
(1963).
149. The resources spent in an attempt to establish certain norms as rules of CIL and to
demonstrate compliance with rules of CIL provide evidence that CIL matters to states. If CIL
did not have some independent impact on state decisions no rational state would expend re-
sources to dispute its meaning.
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importance of state practice relative to opinio juris, the number of states
that must engage in the practice, the time over which the practice must
be followed, the necessary consistency of the practice, or what behaviors
count as state practice.
The scope of opinions on the practice requirement is too broad for
this Article to provide a comprehensive presentation of views, but the
discussion below provides a general sense of the debate. This section
then applies the theory developed earlier to consider the role state prac-
tice plays in CIL. It explains why, contrary to conventional views, the
state practice requirement cannot be a requirement for the establishment
of CIL. Rather, CIL depends only on the existence of opinio juris. This
view does not remove all significance from practice, however, because
one of the ways to identify the beliefs and expectations of states is
through practice. Practice, then, is best viewed as evidence of opinio ju-
ris. This approach helps us to resolve many of the most important
debates surrounding the role of practice.
1. The Existing Doctrine of State Practice
a. The Relative Importance of State Practice and Opinio Juris
One perspective views the practice requirement as the most impor-
tant element of CIL.50 In fact, some commentators go further, arguing
that opiniojuris is not required at all; widespread and consistent practice
is sufficient to infer a legal obligation, at least if there is no evidence of
objection to such a rule."' One can also find opposing arguments, how-
ever, claiming that the focus should be on opinio juris rather than on
practice.5 2 The existing literature, then, offers a wide range of proposals
regarding the proper balance between the opinio juris and state practice
requirements. There are even claims that opinio juris and practice can be
traded off against one another, with varying weights put on each depend-
ing on the circumstances.
53
Focusing on practice rather than opinio juris is sometimes referred
to as the "traditional perspective" on CIL formation.' 4 The alternative
"modern approach" is more normative and considers the moral issues at
stake when determining if a rule of CIL exists.'55 Some prominent
150. See Roberts, supra note 7, at 758.
151. See, e.g., LAUTERPACHT, supra note 131, at 380.
152. See Roberts, supra note 7, at 757-59.
153. See Frederic Kirgis, Appraisals of the ICJ's Decisions: Nicaragua v. United States
(Merits), 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 77, 147-49 (1987).
154. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 7.
155. Id. at 762-63.
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scholars, including Theodor Meron, Richard Lillich, and Lori Bruun,
argue that modern custom provides an important source of law in the
international human rights arena.'5 6 Others, including Michael Reisman
and Arthur Weisburd, argue that modern custom lacks the legitimacy of
state consent and general state practice.'
57
The inability of scholars to come to some consensus on these re-
quirements is not surprising. Without an underlying theory of CIL, its
role, and its effect, scholars have no common principles from which to
derive their conclusions.
b. How General Must the Practice Be?
Under any approach to CIL that includes a role for practice, it is nec-
essary to determine the amount of practice that is needed. Under most
formulations, a "general practice" is required.' 8 Putting aside regional
and bilateral custom for the moment," 9 this means, in principle, that a
large share of affected states must be engaged in the practice. The par-
ticular density of practice required is difficult to specify with precision
and, in any event, is the subject of disagreement among commentators.
For present purposes it is sufficient to note that what is said to be re-
quired is practice that is "uniform, extensive, and representative."'
6
0
Formally, of course, all states have equal rights under international
law,' 6' and no single state or small group of states is able to create or
change CIL on its own.' 62 In practice, there is no doubt that analysis of
CIL rules inevitably gives greater weight to more powerful and more
affected states.' 63 Whether this is desirable or not, it is hard to imagine
156. THEODOR MERON, supra note 57. Lori Lyman Bruun, Note, Beyond the 1948 Con-
vention-Emerging Principles of Genocide in Customary International Law, 17 MD. J. INT'L
L. & TRADE 193, 216-17 (1993); Richard B. Lillich, The Growing Importance of Customary
International Human Rights Law, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 8 (1995/1996).
157. W. Michael Reisman, The Cult of Custom in the Late 20th Century, 17 CAL. W.
INT'L L.J. 133 (1987); Arthur A. Weisburd, Customary International Law: The Problem of
Treaties, 21 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1 (1988).
158. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38.
159. Regional custom is addressed later in Part IV.D.
160. ILA Report, supra note 110, II.C.12.
161. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 1.
162. See Jonathan I. Charney, Universal International Law, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 529, 533
(1993) ("Despite the difference in power and influence of States, no individual or small group
of States is now dominant. Decisions tend to reflect the power relationships and the right of all
States to participate in reaching them.").
163. See WOLFKE, supra note 42, at 78 ("The possibility of the big powers openly im-
posing rules on minor nations no longer exists .... [However,] [p]ractice being the nucleus of
custom, those states are the most important which have the greatest share and interests in such
practice-that is, in most cases the great powers .... Such acceptance on the part of the great
powers frequently has a decisive effect ...."); David P. Fidler, Challenging the Classical
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any other outcome. " One of the important implications of this reality is
that the number of states involved in the formation of CIL is smaller than
it initially seems. For many rules of CIL, powerful states dominate the
question of state practice. The group may grow still smaller once it is
recognized that only states with a stake in the issue must be considered.
It is also worth mentioning that the privileged position held by pow-
erful states, though it features a certain inequity, may have a positive
side. Violations of international law, at least when they are widespread
and ongoing, weaken the international system. When powerful states
commit violations, the harm to the system is likely to be greater still be-
cause such violations tend to have a widespread impact and affect other
powerful states more forcefully. Giving powerful states a larger role in
the creation of CIL reduces the risk that those states will be frequent vio-
lators.
Furthermore, powerful states are less likely than weaker states, all
else equal, to be deterred by a rule of CIL, so the benefits of applying a
rule to them is smaller than it is with a weaker state. Because the costs of
a violation are larger and the benefits of CIL rules smaller for powerful
states, the system may be better off if these states have greater influence
in shaping the relevant rules.
c. What Counts as Practice?
If state practice is relevant to the CIL inquiry, it is necessary to de-
termine what counts as evidence of practice. Clearly, actions by states
are included. For example, a decision to provide diplomatic protection to
foreign representatives is an action that forms part of state practice. Be-
yond these observable actions, however, there are other behaviors whose
relevance is more controversial.
In particular, there is no consensus among commentators about
whether statements or omissions should be considered in the evaluation
of state practice.' 65 D'Amato asserts that only physical acts count and
statements, by diplomats or UN officials for example, are not part of
state practice.' 6 Wolfke makes a similar claim, arguing that statements in
Concept of Custom: Perspectives on the Future of Customary International Law, 39 GERMAN
Y.B. INT'L L. 198, 203-04 (1996).
164. Relatedly, it is hard to imagine an inquiry into the general practice of states that
truly purported to identify such a practice for all or almost all states. See Kelly, supra note 6,
at 521 (noting that "state practice is rarely general, and a few incidents from one culture or
even several countries cannot evidence general acceptance").
165. See D'AMATO, supra note 2, at 61--64 (discussing omissions); ILA Report, supra
note 110, at II.A.6 ("In appropriate circumstances omissions can count as a form of State
practice.").
166. See D'AMATO, supra note 2, at 88.
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the form of voting in international organizations do not "constitute acts
of conduct, nor, even multiplied, any conclusive evidence of any State
practice.' 67 He observes that "repeated verbal acts are also acts of con-
duct in their broad meaning and can give rise to international customs,
but only to customs of making such declarations, etc., and not to cus-
toms of conduct described in the content of the verbal acts.', 68 Akehurst
takes a much more permissive approach, including, for example, domes-
tic laws,' 69 resolutions of international organizations (though only if they
"claim to be declaratory of existing law"), 70 and even "standing or ad
hoc instructions by a State to its officials, or criticisms by one State of
the conduct of other States, or treaties (including treaties which have not
entered into force).'' In fact, his definition of state practice is suffi-
ciently broad to include actions by international organizations and even
bodies such as the United Nations secretariat, which is not composed of
state representatives.'
72
The problem with such a broad interpretation of the state practice
element is that there is no certainty that these statements bear any rela-
tionship to what states actually believe or do. Statements made by
governments and their representatives serve a variety of purposes, are
often made strategically, and will often not reflect the reality of practice.
Torture is the clearest example. There is no shortage of agreements and
statements condemning torture, yet its use by states is commonplace.
173
To declare, based on statements, that state practice is inconsistent with
torture is simply a fiction.
Nevertheless, the majority view is that the practice requirement can
indeed be satisfied with reference to statements and claims made by
states. 1 4 In fact, the most common view would include virtually any ut-
terance by the state or its representatives as evidence of state practice.'75
167. WOLFKE, supra note 42, at 84.
168. Id. at 42.
169. See Akehurst, supra note 4, at 9 ("[Tjhe mere enactment of a law is a form of State
practice").
170. See id. at 5-6.
171. Id. at 10.
172. Id. at 11; see also BROWNLIE, supra note 39, at 5.
173. See supra note 13.
174. See, e.g., Akehurst, supra note 4, at 1-2.
175. See BROWNLIE, supra note 39; ILA Report, supra note 110, at II.A.4 ("Verbal acts,
and not only physical acts, of States count as State practice .... Diplomatic statements (in-
cluding protests), policy statements, press releases, official manuals (e.g., on military law),
instructions to armed forces, comments by governments on draft treaties, legislation, decisions
of national courts and executive authorities, pleadings before international tribunals, state-
ments in international organizations and the resolutions those bodies adopt... are all forms of
speech-act.").
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This perspective appears to have the support of the ICJ as well. For ex-
ample, in the Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in
Morocco case, the court used diplomatic correspondence to evaluate a
claim of state practice. 1
7 6
It should be clear from the above that the state practice requirement
is interpreted in many different ways, ranging from a view that practice
is the only requirement for the establishment of CIL to it being no more
than a minor part of CIL formation. Some only consider state actions as
evidence of practice, while others include virtually anything said by
states and their officials. Once again, without a foundational theory,
there is no particular reason to favor one of these approaches over the
other. Without knowing how CIL works or what it is supposed to do, one
cannot evaluate the merits of alternative interpretations. Because there is
no good theoretical foundation for the practice requirement, there is no
principled way to determine how to satisfy it.
2. A Rational Choice Analysis of State Practice
The main lesson to be drawn from the theory presented here is that
CIL is really about the opinio juris requirement and not the practice re-
quirement. This is so because, as already discussed,"' what matters for
the presence of reputational sanctions is the perspective of other states. If
states as a group believe there is a legal obligation, this is enough to gen-
erate reputational (and perhaps direct) sanctions. The question of
practice is not directly relevant to the issue. Thus, for example, if there is
a general perception that torture is a violation of international legal




A rational choice approach, then, leaves no room for a state practice
requirement other than as an evidentiary touchstone to reveal opinio ju-
ris. Practice can shed light on whether a particular norm is regarded as
obligatory, but it does not by itself make it so.
There is no practice requirement for the establishment of a
CIL rule. Practice may be relevant inasmuch as it affects the
176. See Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco (Fr. V. U.S.),
1952 I.C.J. 176, 200 (Aug. 27).
177. See supra Part III.
178. It is true that frequent practice would plausibly reduce the reputational sanction of
engaging in torture, but this would be because the practice reduced the sense among states that
to engage in the activity is to violate an important legal norm. In other words, the driving force
behind the use of reputational sanctions is not the practice itself, but rather the sense that a
state has failed to honor legal obligations.
Fall 20051
Michigan Journal of International Law
perceptions of states regarding the existence of a legal rule
(opinio juris).
With this understanding of state practice, one can consider how ob-
servers evaluate state behavior.79 Though opinio juris determines
whether states face a rule of CIL, it is difficult to observe. We must,
therefore, use what we can observe as evidence. State practice, whether
in words or deeds, can be evidence of opinio juris. Not only does this
clarify the role of practice, it sheds light on how a particular incident
should be viewed. Explicit state action that seems contrary to the short-
term interests of a state, and that is accompanied by claims that the state
is acting out of a sense of legal obligation, offers strong evidence of
opinio juris. In contrast to this evidence, statements including, for exam-
ple, votes on General Assembly resolutions offer weaker evidence of
opinio juris. The precise evaluation of such evidence will inevitably de-
pend on the context of the acts or statements, but this approach
articulates clearly how practice can affect judgments about opinio juris.
State practice may offer evidence of opinio juris.
Relegating state practice to an evidentiary role is a change from the
standard formulation of CIL. It is not, however, without support in the
literature or the jurisprudence of international law. In the Military and
Paramilitary Activities case, the ICJ found a rule of CIL, consistent with
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, requiring states to refrain from the use of
force. 80 It did this without reference to practice. The Court focused in-
stead on opinio juris, which it found by looking at, among other things,
UN resolutions.' 8'
The Military and Paramilitary Activities case suggests that the ICJ
is, at times, prepared to accept opinio juris as sufficient to establish the
existence of CIL. That said, one can question whether the ICJ evaluated
the evidence of opiniojuris in a sensible way. Both the United States and
Nicaragua had, as the ICJ observed, recognized the prohibition on the
use of force in many ways. The ICJ relied in particular on the UN Decla-
ration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations
and Cooperation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the
179. The discussion that follows is written in a somewhat normative style in that it dis-
cusses how practice should be interpreted as evidence of opinio juris. The same discussion can
be seen as a positive one, however, if it is interpreted as a discussion of what information prac-
tice offers regarding opiniojuris.
180. See supra note 134.
181. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 191-92
(June 27).
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1T • 82 ,83 IUnited Nations, a resolution adopted by consensus. In contrast to this
declaration, the conduct of both parties suggested that they viewed the
use of force, in certain situations where it was not permitted by the UN
Charter, as an acceptable tool. Given the difficulty of establishing the
beliefs of states, it is sensible to use UN resolutions and other statements
as evidence of opinio juris, but the fact that states at times make state-
ments that do not represent their true beliefs suggests that such
statements should normally be considered less probative than actions.
This discussion of the Military and Paramilitary Activities case can
be generalized to shed light on how various types of practice should be
weighed. Actions of states, especially those that seem contrary to state
interests but for the existence of an international law rule, offer the most
persuasive evidence of opinio juris. Other actions might also carry sig-
nificant weight. Omissions, unless there is some credible reason to
believe that a state refrained from an action out of a sense of legal obli-
gation, have a more tenuous claim as evidence. Statements by countries
are suspect unless the context suggests they are credible representations
of beliefs. More generally, whatever evidence is put forward, its value
depends on the extent to which it can credibly be said to represent the
beliefs of states about international legal obligations.
Practice (including statements) that is more probative of
opinio juris should be given greater weight in evaluating the
existence of CIL.
One of the ways in which a rule of CIL may show itself is through a
United Nations resolution. 8 If the resolution reflects opinio juris, it also
reflects CIL. Notice the implication of this analysis for UN resolutions.
Consistent with the fact that the General Assembly lacks legislative
power, the resolution does not "make" CIL. Rather, it provides evidence
of the underlying opinio juris. This also means that there is no sense in
which the General Assembly is able to "change" the law. And if General
Assembly resolutions represent evidence of opinio juris, they need not
all be viewed in the same way. That is, the relevance of a resolution de-
pends on its context. Some resolutions will provide little or no
information about the underlying opinio juris, whereas others may be
highly probative.
182. G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc.
A/8028 (1971).
183. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, V 191-92
(June 27).
184. Bin Cheng, for example, discussed UN resolutions on outer space. Cheng, infra
note 197.
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The general approach to CIL adopted here speaks to what is some-
times termed the "modern approach" to CIL. The modern approach
considers the moral issues at stake in evaluating the existence of CIL.'85
It turns out that this view cannot be reconciled with a rational choice
approach to CIL. Putting aside the significant question of who decides
the moral importance of an issue, the existence of a moral imperative for
states to act in a certain way says nothing about whether the states them-
selves believe that such actions are legally required. Because we model
CIL as a set of rules the violation of which will generate costs, a norm
can only be a rule of CIL if the opinio juris element is met. If it is not,
there is no reason for any state to adjust its behavior. Note that the claim
here is not that states ignore the morality of their actions, but rather that
CIL norms only matter if there is a sense of opinio juris. Nor is this a
claim that moral arguments do not, cannot, or should not matter. Moral
arguments may affect the attitudes of states, including their beliefs about
international legal obligations. The critical point is that moral arguments
cannot directly influence the formation of CIL. They can only do so to
the extent that they affect the beliefs of states. Aspirational statements by
the General Assembly, for example, may influence beliefs, but they do
not independently support the notion that there is rule of CIL.
"Modern CIL," to the extent it is based on moral and norma-
tive claims rather than opinio juris, does not create a legal
obligation.
The rational choice approach also largely resolves the question of
how much practice is necessary. Because practice is relevant only as evi-
dence of opinio juris, we must ask, in any given situation, what existing
practice tells us about the legal obligation states perceive. In general,
then, more practice is more likely to evidence a sense of legal obligation,
though the relevance of any particular practice will be contextual.
The view of opinio juris and practice advanced here is different from
past discussions of CIL and has some significant differences with respect
to its implications, but it nevertheless resembles statements made by
some commentators. Akehurst, for example, argues that "[c]ustomary
international law is created by State practice. State practice means any
185. See, e.g., Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., Custom on a Sliding Scale, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 146,
147-48 (1987) (stating that the fundamental rights articulated in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights are regarded as customary law, regardless of persistent violations or noncon-
forming state practice); Roberts, supra note 7, at 764 ("[T]he customary prohibition on torture
expresses a moral abhorrence of torture rather than an accurate description of state practice.")
(citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES,
§ 702 (1987)).
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act or statement by a State from which views about customary law can
be inferred."'' 86 Though framed as giving primacy to practice, in fact this
formulation looks to practice to learn about the "views" of states. This is
close to the perspective advanced herein, in which practice offers evi-
dence of state beliefs.
It should be acknowledged that there is a certain unsatisfying vague-
ness to all of this. Actors within a legal system normally prefer clear
rules so they can anticipate the consequences of their actions. Certainly,
the formulation of CIL advanced here cannot claim to provide this sort
of certainty. This ambiguity is unfortunate, but unavoidable. Because
CIL is formed by state beliefs, which are unobservable, and actions,
which can be interpreted in many ways, the process of identifying CIL is
difficult and dependent on context. When this is combined with the lack
of a process to explicitly identify CIL rules, there is no way to avoid the
vagueness of CIL.'87
C. Instant Custom
1. The Existing Doctrine of Instant Custom
One of the many areas of disagreement regarding CIL relates to the
amount of time necessary to establish or change a rule. One view, nor-
mally credited to Bin Cheng, is that CIL can change in a moment,
creating what can be referred to as "instant custom. ' "s
In contrast to instant custom, the traditional CIL requirement of a
"general practice" suggests some minimum period of time over which
there must be a practice before one can speak of a rule of CIL. Consis-
tent with this traditional approach, the majority view today is that
although there is no minimum amount of time required to generate CIL,
some time must nevertheless elapse. 9
ICJ jurisprudence is consistent with this majority view. In the North
Sea Continental Shelf cases, the court dismissed the requirement of an
extended period of practice, observing that "the passage of only a short
186. Akehurst, supra note 4, at 53.
187. With the exception of claims that CIL is irrelevant, I am not aware of any writing
that provides an approach to CIL with substantially more clarity and certainty than the one
advanced here.
188. See Bin Cheng, Custom: The Future of General State Practice in a Divided World,
in THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY
DOCTRINE AND THEORY 513, 532 (R. St. J. MacDonald & Douglas M. Johnston eds., 1983).
189. See ILA Report, supra note 110, at II.C.12(ii); G.M. DANILENKO, LAW-MAKING IN
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 97, 97 n.74 (1993) (stating that the practice requirement
"presupposes duration of custom-generating practice over a certain period of time," and that
"[i]t follows that there can be no such thing as 'instant' customary international law".).
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period of time is not necessarily ... a bar to the formation of a new
rule."' 90 The court refused to abandon the notion of a practice require-
ment, however, stating:
[A]n indispensable requirement would be that within the period
in question, short though it may be, State practice ... should
have been both extensive and virtually uniform ... and should
moreover have occurred in such a way as to show a general rec-
ognition that a rule of law or legal obligation is involved.'9 '
The report on CIL by the International Law Commission to the Gen-
eral Assembly (ILA Report) and the Restatement on Foreign Relations
both follow the lead of the North Sea Continental Shelf cases. The ILA
Report, for example, concludes that there is no specific time requirement
for the formation of CIL.' 92 Like the ICJ, the report stops short of elimi-
nating the practice requirement, stating instead that there must be
"practice of sufficient density."' ' The Restatement provides that "The
practice necessary to create customary law may be of comparatively
short duration but under Subsection (2) it must be 'general and consis-
tent.' ,
Some academic commentary has strongly criticized instant custom.
Van Hoof asserts that "customary law and instantaneousness are irrecon-
cilable concepts."' 95 Weil correctly observes that instant custom is "no
mere acceleration of the custom-formation process, but a veritable revo-
lution in the theory of custom.' ' 96 This is so because acceptance of
instant custom requires that one discard the requirement of a general
practice. After all, practice, especially among many states, cannot
change instantly. If CIL depends on practice, then the pace at which it
can form or change is limited by the pace at which practice changes.
2. A Rational Choice Analysis of Instant Custom
Bin Cheng's approach, which he does not attempt to apply to CIL as
a whole, is quite close to that proposed in this Article. Like this Article,
190. North Sea Continental Shelf (ER.G. v. Den., F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 74
(Feb. 20).
191. Id.
192. See ILA Report, supra note 110, II.C. 12 cmt. b.
193. Id.
194. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES,
§ 102 cmt. b (1987).
195. See G.J.H. VAN HOOF, RETHINKING THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 86
(1983).
196. Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?, 77 AM. J. INT'L
L. 413, 435 (1983).
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Cheng believes that opinio juris is sufficient to establish a rule of CIL.
Practice is relevant, but "the role of usage in the establishment of rules of
customary international law is purely evidentiary: it provides evidence
on the one hand of the contents of the rule in question and on the other
hand of the opiniojuris of the States concerned.' 97
If one accepts that opiniojuris is sufficient to establish a rule of CIL,
it follows that such rules can develop or change as easily and as quickly
as opinio juris. It is possible, therefore, for a rule to develop in a very
short period or even instantly. As Cheng puts it, "as international law is a
horizontal legal system in which States are both the law-makers and the
subjects of the legal system, opinio juris can arise or change instantane-
ously."'98
CIL arises or changes "instantly" if opinio juris changes in-
stantly.
D. Special Custom
1. The Existing Doctrine of Special Custom
Most discussions of CIL focus on "general custom" that applies
worldwide. There can, however, be CIL over smaller groups of states.'99
This "special" or "regional" CIL can exist among any number of states
and potentially as few as two.20 If a subset of states meet the require-
ments of opinio juris and state practice (under the traditional definition
of CIL), they are bound by a rule of special CIL.
The ICJ has produced several opinions that discuss special custom,
and these provide the best guidance on the topic. In the Right of Passage
Over Indian Territory, the ICJ looked to the relationship between Portu-
gal and India and the course of dealing between them. It treated silence
on the part of India as acquiescence with regard to the Portuguese right
of passage.20' India had customarily allowed passage and honored terms
in treaties that dealt with the right of passage to Portuguese enclaves
197. Bin Cheng, United Nations Resolutions on Outer Space: "Instant" International
Customary Law?, 5 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 23, 36 (1965).
198. Cheng, supra note 188, at 532.
199. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES, § 102 cmt. e (1987); D'AMATO, supra note 2, at 233-34; Akehurst, supra note 4, at
28-31.
200. See Right of Passage (Port. v. India), 1960 I.C.J. 6, 39 (Apr. 12) ("The Court sees
no reason why long continued practice between two States accepted by them as regulating




Michigan Journal of International Law
surrounded by Indian territory, at least with respect to the passage of
civil officials and private persons and their goods. The ICJ held, there-
fore, that both countries accepted the rule of CIL for these purposes, and
Portugal was entitled to the right of passage.
The ICJ's decision in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries cases also de-
manded conspicuous objection from a state seeking to escape local
custom. The United Kingdom claimed that the ten-mile bay closing line
rule was a general rule of CIL and Norway could not use its system of
straight baselines to create exclusive fishing rights in the waters sur-
rounding its entire coastline north of the Arctic Circle.0 3 The court held
that Norway had applied their system of delimitation, with the use of
straight lines, "consistently and uninterruptedly from 1869 until the time
when the dispute arose" without a challenge from the United Kingdom
or the international community.2° The court further held that the practice
had become regional custom and the United Kingdom, which had been
silent on the matter for over 60 years, could not claim otherwise. 5
The Asylum case produced a different rule.2° In that case, Peru had
refrained from signing the Montevideo Conventions of 1933 and 1939,
which allowed a state granting asylum in its embassy the right to qualify
the asylum seeker as a political offender.20 7 The ICJ ruled that where a
regional custom was at issue, silence on the part of a state signaled ob-
jection to the custom.28 This view-that special custom requires some
affirmative proof from a state-is supported by D'Amato, who claims
that "[s]pecial custom does indeed require stringent proof of consent or
recognition of a practice on the part of the defendant state.' 2°
2. A Rational Choice Analysis of Special Custom
When viewed through a rational choice lens, special custom be-
comes a simple application of the theory already presented. The basic
model of this Article provides that states are bound by a rule of CIL
when other states believe there is a relevant legal obligation. That is, a
rule of CIL exists if and only if opiniojuris exists.
202. Id. at 43. However, the court noted that "no right of passage in favor of Portugal
involving a correlative obligation on India had been established in respect of armed forces,
armed police, and arms and ammunition." Id.
203. Fisheries (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116, 131 (Dec. 18, 1951).
204. Id. at 138.
205. Id.
206. Asylum (Colom. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266 (Nov. 20).
207. Id. at 268-69, 277-78.
208. Id. at 278.
209. D'AMATO, supra note 2, at 234.
[Vol. 27:115
Saving Customary International Law
This view applies directly to both general and special custom. Over
any group of states (ranging from two to all states), the presence or ab-
sence of opiniojuris determines the existence of a rule of CIL.
Special custom can arise within any group of states, including
as few as two states. For such custom to arise, it is sufficient
that the states involved have the requisite opinio juris.
The question debated in the ICJ cases, and to some extent in the lit-
erature, about whether to require explicit consent to a special custom
does not come up in this formulation because only opinio juris is rele-
vant.
One might still wonder how matters of special custom should be
handled when they come before international tribunals. In particular,
should a tribunal require more evidence of opinio juris for special cus-
tom than it would for general custom? This would be similar to the
approach taken in the Asylum case and favored by D'Amato.
My view is that it is neither necessary nor desirable to increase the
showing required to find opinio juris in special custom. In a world of
heterogeneous states, there is reason to think special custom will play an
important role in the relations among them. Special custom has the po-
tential to facilitate cooperation among states in areas where it is simply
too difficult to establish general norms of CIL. Where states are interact-
ing in a way that indicates the presence of opinio juris, I see no reason
why a tribunal should be reluctant to make that finding.
V. A NORMATIVE ASSESSMENT OF CIL DOCTRINE
The previous section applied the rational choice theory of compli-
ance and evaluated what that theory means as a positive matter for CIL.
This Part examines more normative questions relevant to some addi-
tional aspects of CIL. In particular, it considers the relationship between
treaties and CIL, the persistent and subsequent objector doctrines, and
the application of CIL to new states. In each case, the rational choice
theory yields conclusions about how the relevant doctrine should be ap-
plied.
A. Treaties and CIL Formation
1. The Existing Doctrine of Treaties and CIL Formation
There is debate about the extent to which treaties can or should be
used as sources in the formation of CIL. Conceptually, treaties are prob-
lematic sources for CIL because by their very nature they can alter legal
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obligations. That is, one of the main functions of treaties is to establish
new obligations among states--obligations that do not exist under CIL.20
When faced with practice based on treaty obligations, then, it is difficult
to know if this reflects opinio juris. To cite one example, the vast major-
ity of states are members of the WTO and, accordingly, have accepted
obligations with respect to trade. They have agreed, for instance, to pro-
vide national treatment and most favored nation status to imports. These
same obligations are present in many other treaties, including regional
and bilateral trade agreements. These requirements are not present be-
cause there is some underlying customary law that requires them, but
rather because the states involved wanted to create additional legal obli-
gations beyond those provided by CIL.
Of course, treaties can also codify custom, and so one cannot use
treaty provisions as evidence against the existence of CIL. The easiest
example here is the ban on the use of force in the UN Charter. " The
presence of this rule in the Charter is generally thought to reinforce,
rather than change, a CIL rule.
The ICJ seems to accept that treaties can serve as evidence of CIL,
and it has used them in this way on numerous occasions. In the S.S.
Wimbledon case, the court used treaties concerning the Suez and Panama
canals to support the principle of neutrality of international canals.22 The
PCIJ similarly used the Covenant of the League of Nations to support
the principle of unanimity of states in its Advisory Opinion on Interpre-
tation of Article 3, Paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Lausanne (Frontier
between Turkey and Iraq).1 In the Fisheries Jurisdiction case of 1974,
the court made use of bilateral and multilateral international agreements
to demonstrate a widespread acceptance of the preferential rights of fish-
ing.14 In the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf cases, the court noted that
treaty provisions may indeed generate CIL, stating that treaties are "one
of the recognized methods by which new rules of customary interna-
tional law may be formed. 215
The views of commentators on this question are varied and oftenS 216
conclusory. Whatever the merit of these claims, they do not emerge
from a coherent theory of international law and so it is difficult to evalu-
210. See Mendelson, supra note 114, at 295.
211. U.N. Charter, art. 2, para. 4.
212. See WOLFKE, supra note 42.
213. Interpretation of Article 3, Paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Lausanne (Frontier be-
tween Turkey and Iraq), Advisory Opinion, 1925 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 12 (Nov. 21).
214. Fisheries (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116, 138 (Dec. 18).
215. North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den., F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 41 71
(Feb. 20).
216. For a more complete discussion, see BYERS, supra note 2, at 166-80.
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ate them. It is perhaps for this reason that debate here, and on so many
other questions of CIL, has failed to generate a consensus view.
D'Amato adopts a position that favors the use of treaties as evidence
of state practice. "[A] treaty arguably is a clear record of a binding inter-
national commitment that constitutes the 'practice of states' and hence is
as much a record of customary behavior as any other state act or re-
straint."21 7 Akehurst adopts a similar, though less aggressive position,
stating that he "has no difficulty in regarding treaties as State practice,"
but noting that treaties "must be accompanied by opinio juris in order to
create customary law.' 218 One way to satisfy the opinio juris requirement,
at least for the parties to a treaty, he argues, is to find statements in the
text of the treaty or the travaux preparatoires stating that the treaty codi-
fies existing customary law. According to Akehurst, statements and
actions subsequent to the treaty can also satisfy this requirement.211 Men-
delson adopts a restrained view of the role of treaties, stating that "there
is no legal presumption that a treaty does or does not reflect customary
law if it does not give such an indication on its face., 220 A more critical
position of the use of treaties as sources of custom is offered by Wolfke,
who argues that treaties only bind the parties who have accepted their
terms, and those obligations cannot be imposed on third parties without
further action.22'
2. A Rational Choice Analysis of Treaties and CIL Formation
Recall that what matters for CIL is whether states believe that a
norm amounts to a legal obligation. Once it is recognized that this is the
focus of the inquiry, the role of treaties is obvious. To the extent that a
treaty (or set of treaties) evidences opinio juris, it is useful evidence of a
rule of CIL. If, on the other hand, treaties are in place to establish a rule
that would not otherwise exist, then they are evidence against a CIL rule.
Notice that because we only look to practice as evidence of opinio juris,
it is not necessary to concern ourselves with the role of treaties as evi-
dence of state practice.
Treaties are relevant to the formation of CIL only to the extent
they represent evidence of opinio juris.
In the context of the evaluation of a potential rule of CIL, a focus on
opinio juris can often resolve the question of how treaties should be
217. D'AMATO, supra note 2, at 104.
218. Akehurst, supra note 4, at 43-44.
219. Id. at 49-51.
220. Mendelson, supra note 114, at 301.
221. WOLFKE, supra note 42, at 68-72.
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considered. If, for example, one accepts that a treaty or group of treaties
was established to derogate from existing custom or to create rules
where no CIL rules previously existed (as in the case of most trade trea-
ties), then it is safe to say that the treaties are not, by themselves,
evidence of CIL. I have previously advanced an argument along these
lines to suggest that bilateral investment treaties (BITs) should not be
222seen as evidence of a CIL rule governing investment. The conclusion
that BITs are not evidence of custom follows from the claim that these
treaties are not the result of states codifying an existing legal rule, but
rather are the product of developed states seeking protection for their
foreign investors that exceeds the protection provided by the background
rules of international law.223
To some extent, this position is consistent with that of Akehurst, who
views treaties as evidence of practice and who would look for evidence
of opinio juris, much as this Article proposes. As Akehurst points out,
there may be evidence of opinio juris in the text of the agreement itself
or in the travaux preparatoires.
None of this discussion is meant to suggest that the inquiry into trea-
ties will be simple. It will often be difficult to know if treaties are meant
to codify custom or establish some alternative rule. The point is that the
inquiry into the role of treaties will be much more productive if it is fo-
cused on this one issue.
B. Persistent and Subsequent Objectors
1. The Existing Doctrine of Persistent and Subsequent Objectors
CIL doctrine provides that a state can avoid being bound by a rule of
CIL by establishing itself as a "persistent objector."'224 A state is consid-
ered a persistent objector if, "whilst a practice is developing into a rule
of general law, [it] persistently and openly dissents from the rule.' 225 A
persistent objector loses that status if it does not object consistently over
222. Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties that Hurt Them: Explaining the Popu-
larity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 639 (1998).
223. Id.
224. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES, § 102 cmt. d (1987) ("[A] dissenting state which indicates its dissent from a practice
while the law is still in a state of development is not bound by that rule of law even after it
matures."); Chamey, supra note 115, at 2 ("[V]irtually all authorities maintain that a State
which objects to an evolving rule of general customary international law can be exempted
from its obligations."); Mendelson, supra note 114. Other useful articles on the persistent
objector doctrine include David A. Colson, How Persistent Must the Persistent Objector Be?,
61 WASH. L. REV. 957 (1986); Stein, supra note 120, at 457.
225. ILA Report, supra note l10, art. 15; Akehurst, supra note 4, at 24.
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time once the rule is in place. Furthermore, a state that fails to object
during the formation of the rule remains bound regardless of its later at-
tempts to protest. This is true even if the state had no interest in the rule
at the time of its emergence but subsequently came to 
be affected by it.1
26
The above represents the conventional view of the persistent objector
doctrine. It is not, however, a consensus view; like the rest of CIL, the
doctrine is contested. Most authors accept that it is part of CIL,
227 but
others argue that it does not exist or is of minimal importance.
228 The ICJ
has provided some support for the doctrine, though the jurisprudence is
not definitive. In the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case, for example, the
court stated that the CIL rule in question was "inapplicable as against
Norway inasmuch as she has always opposed any attempt to apply it to
the Norwegian coast.' 229 In the Asylum case, the court stated that even if
a relevant regional custom existed, it did not bind Peru because that state
had repudiated the norm.230 Though these cases are often used to support
the existence of the persistent objector doctrine, critics, including
D'Amato, argue that they speak to special or regional custom rather than
general custom.' Charney, in turn, argues that the cases are not authori-
tative because they are dicta.232
Even those who grant the existence of the rule have no strong theo-
retical justification for it.233 The ILA Report defends the rule as a
compromise between notions of consent and the need for development
of the law:
It respects States' sovereignty and protects them from having
new law imposed on them against their will by a majority; but at
the same time, if the support for the new rule is sufficiently
widespread, the convoy of the law's progressive development
226. See LA Report, supra note 110, art. 15, cmt b.
227. See BROWNLIE, supra note 39, at 10; Akehurst, supra note 4; Weil, supra note 196,
at 413.
228. See D'AMATO, supra note 2, at 233-63; Chamey, supra note 115, at 24; Stein, su-
pra note 120, at 457.
229. Fisheries (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116, 131 (Dec. 18, 1951).
230. Asylum (Colom. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266, 277-78 (Nov. 20). The separate opinion
of Judge de Castro in the Fisheries Jurisdiction case stated that a fisheries limit of 12 miles
did not apply to Iceland because it had persistently objected to that rule. Fisheries (U.K. v.
Nor.), 1951 I.CJ. 116, 91-92 (Dec. 18, 1951).
231. D'AMATO, supra note 2, at 252-54.
232. Charney, supra note 115, at 9-10. But see Mendelson, supra note 114, at 231.
233. See Fidler, supra note 3, at 209 ("The solid place the persistent objector rule occu-
pies in the pedagogical perspective confuses students given the lack of a credible theoretical
explanation and limited support for the rule found in State practice.").
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can move forward without having to wait for the slowest ves-
sel .234
This explanation has a number of problems, even if we put aside its
conclusory nature. For example, if the doctrine represents a compromise
between sovereignty and the need for progress, why must the objector
raise its objection at the time the rule is formed? Surely it is no less an
affront to sovereignty to bind a state that was previously disinterested but
is now affected by a rule than it is to bind a state that objected at the time
the rule came into being. Furthermore, there is no reason why this sup-
posed compromise is served by a requirement that the objection be
persistent and open. Nor would subsequent objectors impede the pro-
gress of the law. Rather than challenging and undermining existing rules
of CIL, a state could become a subsequent objector. Exempting subse-
quent objectors would also protect state sovereignty more effectively
than the current rule.
A consent-based theory, of course, would have to provide an excep-
tion for those who fail to consent. But consent theories cannot explain
why the persistent objector doctrine puts such a significant burden on the
objector not only to demonstrate its lack of consent, but to do so repeat-
edly and during the emergence of the rule. 35
The failure to establish a solid theoretical justification for the rule
should not surprise us. CIL is under-theorized in general, and what the-
ory it has is often incompletely formulated.236 The conventional
theoretical justification, such as it is, turns on notions of state consent
that have already been criticized in this Article. 3' Once the notion of
state consent is abandoned, "the persistent objector rule loses coher-
ency.!
238
2. A Rational Choice Analysis of Persistent
and Subsequent Objectors
The theoretical foundation for CIL presented in this Article allows us
to consider the persistent objector doctrine in a more systematic way, to
identify its potential benefits, and to judge its desirability. This analysis
leads to the conclusion that the persistent objector doctrine is not only
234. LA Report, supra note 110, II.C.15, cmt. c.
235. See supra note 118; see also Charney, supra note 115, at 6 (pointing out that con-
sent cannot explain the persistent objector doctrine because a consent-based approach would
allow both passive and subsequent objectors to avoid application of the rule).
236. For a formal model analyzing certain features of the persistent objector doctrine,
see Fon & Parisi, Stability and Change in International Customary Law, supra note 10.
237. See supra notes 114-144 and accompanying text.
238. See Fidler, supra note 3, at 209; see also Charney, supra note 115, at 16.
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defensible, but its role in the system should almost certainly be in-
creased. Given the role that such a doctrine can serve, it should be
extended to include new states and "subsequent objectors" that cannot
currently take advantage of any analogous exception, and it should be
239made easier to use.
The relevance of the persistent and subsequent objector doctrines
depends, ultimately, on the beliefs of states. For example, does a state
that persistently objects to a CIL rule thereby exempt itself from that rule
in the eyes of other states? There is no way to answer this question as a
theoretical matter, and so the Article does not attempt to do so. What
follows seeks instead to determine whether the system would better
function with some sort of exceptions for persistent and/or subsequent
objectors and, if so, what the doctrine providing those exceptions should
look like.
To examine the merits of the persistent objector exception, consider
the way in which CIL might affect a state's behavior. A state considering
an action that would be a violation of a CIL norm must include in its
calculation of costs and benefits the reputational and direct costs that
will result. For some states in some circumstances, the additional costs
resulting from the presence of an international law rule will be sufficient
to deter them from taking the action in question. For other states, how-
ever, the sanction for a violation of CIL will be insufficient to prevent the
action."O
The key question is how the CIL system should deal with those
states for which existing sanctions are insufficient to generate deterrence.
If no exception is created for these states, they will nevertheless violate
the relevant rule and suffer the associated reputational and direct sanc-
tions. These sanctions impose a cost on the violating state and possibly
on other states. Direct sanctions in particular are likely to be costly to all
states involved. Furthermore, the presence of states that are consistently
and systematically violating the law will weaken the international legal
system.
Alternatively, the system could provide an exception for states that
cannot be deterred. This would avoid the systemic costs associated with
ongoing violations, the cost to sanctioned states, and the costs to sanc-
tioning states. Given the underlying reality that CIL cannot deter the
239. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES, § 102 cmt. d (1987).
240. Because CIL is the product of state beliefs and expectations (opinio juris), the rule
itself will cease to apply if enough states come to believe that it is not a legal obligation. To
focus on a circumstance in which the persistent objector would have some relevance, it is
assumed that the CIL rule remains intact in the examples given.
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states in question, the creation of an exception is sensible because it gen-
erates these savings without related costs. T4 The problem with an
exception, of course, is that there must be some way to identify the states
to which it should apply.
We are faced, then, with a familiar sorting problem. Ideally, the ex-
ception would apply to all states that, absent an exception, would violate
the law, but would not apply to any other states. If this were possible, the
CIL rule would have the same impact on behavior whether or not an ex-
ception was in place (i.e., it would deter the same amount of illegal
conduct), and the total costs associated with violations would fall.2 2
The states that cannot be deterred by a CIL rule are those for which
the modest increase in costs triggered by a violation is insufficient to
make compliance worthwhile. Because these states know they will vio-
late the rule, they also have an incentive to oppose its formation and to
discredit it as a rule of CIL.
It costs these states very little to make it clear that they do not intend
to comply with the relevant rule. Doing so also has the benefit of putting
others on notice and reducing the cost of a violation and the associated
reputational sanction.
States that can be deterred, however, face a different calculus. For
these states, absent a persistent objector exception, compliance with the
norm is the best option and it is in their interest to make clear to other
states that they plan to follow the CIL rule. Doing so signals they are
willing to abide by the rules, yields reputational benefits, and allows
other states to act in reliance.
Now consider how these same states will behave in the presence of a
persistent objector exception. The undeterred state must choose between
signaling to others that it will not comply and waiting until the time to
act arrives and then violating the rule. If there is an exception for persis-
tent objectors, the state can reduce the costs of its noncompliance by
meeting the requirements of this objection. It may still face some costs
for failing to behave consistent with prevailing norms, but it will not face
the additional costs associated with a violation of international law. That
is, by establishing itself as a persistent objector, the state avoids being in
violation and, therefore, reduces the costs of its actions.
241. This is something of an overstatement because reputational costs, which are a cost
to the sanctioned state, represent a gain to other states. States that observe the violation and
update their beliefs about the violating states gain information as a result of the violation.
242. I have previously written on how treaties among states are designed to avoid unnec-
essary costs in the event of violations. See Andrew T. Guzman, The Cost of Credibility:
Explaining Resistance to Interstate Dispute Resolution Mechanisms, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 303
(2002); Guzman, supra note 104.
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Forcing the state to declare its refusal to comply in advance serves
several goals. First, it discourages opportunistic use of the exception by
limiting it to states that are prepared to bear the cost of declaring them-
selves objectors. Second, it puts other states on notice and allows them
to behave accordingly by, for example, not relying on compliance by the
objecting state. Finally, it increases the costs of being a persistent objec-
tor because it requires the state to object to the rule itself and not simply
to the rule as it applies in a particular circumstance. This is important
because it discourages states that can be deterred by the rule from posing
as states that cannot be deterred.
The persistent objector doctrine is a sensible mechanism to
separate those who can be deterred by a legal rule from those
that cannot and to apply the rule only to the former.
The requirement that the objection be made consistently also makes
sense in this context because it makes the role of persistent objector
more costly and, therefore, discourages opportunistic objections by
states that can be deterred.
To preserve its status as a persistent objector, a state should
have to object consistently over time.
So a rational choice theory of CIL supports a persistent objector doc-
trine that resembles the one currently in place. 24' But more should be
said. If there is merit in allowing states to object to a rule at the time it is
formed, what about after its formation? Should there also be a subse-
quent objector doctrine?
In contrast to current doctrine, the theory developed in this Article
suggests that there is no bright line distinction between a state that ob-
jects when a rule is formed and one that objects later in time. A state that
did not object at the time of formation because, for instance, it had no
interest in the rule may subsequently be a state with an interest and one
that cannot be deterred by the rule.
To illustrate, suppose that a CIL rule governing the limits of a state's
territorial waters comes into being. A state that does not venture far from
its own coast and has only a modest fishing industry may have little in-
terest in the rule. Years later, however, that state may develop a large
fishing industry that is affected by the rule. Under the existing doctrine,
only those states that had an interest in the rule at the time it was formed
are able to become persistent objectors. This is problematic because the
243. To be clear, I do not claim that the existing rule emerged because it is consistent
with this theory. Rather, the theory provides an independent justification for the doctrine.
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question of whether a state can be deterred by the rule (and therefore
whether it makes sense to label it an objector and give it an exception) is
unrelated to the state's interest in the rule at the time the rule came into
being. What matters is the interest of the state at the time it acts. The
logic that makes the persistent objector doctrine sensible for those that
object at the time a rule is formed also makes it sensible for states that
object later in time-absent an exception to the rule, some states will
prefer to violate the law rather than comply with it. A rule that allows
persistent and subsequent objectors to escape this legal obligation avoids
the unnecessary costs associated with labeling such states violators.
244
An exception that allows subsequent objectors to avoid the applica-
tion of a rule does have one complication that the persistent objector
exception does not. Part of the merit of the latter is that it forces states to
identify themselves as objectors early on, often before they have to make
a decision about compliance or noncompliance. Forcing this early decla-
ration prevents states from opportunistically claiming an exemption from
a rule of CIL when a situation arises in which they wish to violate that
rule.
The persistent objector doctrine's requirement that objections be
made at the time the rule emerges, then, serves an important role in dis-
tinguishing states that would not comply in any event from those that can
be deterred by the rule. A subsequent objector doctrine does not have a
natural way to make this distinction. If a state is able to make its objec-
tion clear on the eve of an action that is in violation of a CIL rule, it is
much less likely that we will be able to separate states that cannot be
deterred from those that can.
An effective subsequent objector doctrine, then, should have some
additional features. A sufficient condition for use of such an exception is
that the state object from the moment at which it has an interest in the
issue. In the territorial sea example above, this would require a subse-
quent objector to make clear and consistent objection to the rule from the
time it affects the objector's fishing industry in a significant way.24 5
244. There may be instances in which allowing objectors to opt out of a rule generates
costs that exceed the benefits. This would be the case if the marginal impact of the persistent
(or subsequent) objector doctrine on compliance was sufficiently costly that it more than offset
the gains from allowing states to object clearly in advance. Where this is the case, obviously
the system would be better off without a persistent or subsequent objector doctrine.
245. There would clearly not be a particular date at which time the objection must begin,
but this is equally true of the existing persistent objector rule-there is no fixed date on which
a rule of CIL comes into being. Rather, the rule develops over time and a state must object at
some point during the period in which the rule is emerging. For example, as a state develops a
fishing fleet, they are more likely to be affected by the territorial sea rules, and though we
[Vol. 27:115
Saving Customary International Law
Subsequent objectors whose objection to a rule of CIL is clear
and consistent from the moment they have a significant inter-
est in the issue should be exempt from the CIL obligation.
Notice that the rational choice approach to CIL now provides a ra-
tionale for the persistent objector doctrine that is unrelated to the
traditional and problematic notion of state consent. This offers a re-
sponse to D'Amato, who dismisses the doctrine because it relies on the
discredited idea that CIL emerges from a consent-based theory of inter-
national law.2' 6
If, as stated in the above analysis, the persistent objector doctrine is
valuable, there remains the practical problem that it rarely seems to be
used by states. One would think that in a world with a large number of
heterogeneous states there would be many instances in which one or
more would wish to exempt themselves from a particular rule. Indeed, in
the mid-1980s Stein predicted an increase in use of the exception for
241precisely these reasons. Yet, it remains difficult to identify instances in
which the exception has been used. This lack of use of the doctrine is
troubling; if the exception has value but is not being used, we should be
concerned that the possible gains from the exception are being lost.
One possibility is that the lack of a subsequent objector doctrine ex-
plains the light use of the exception. For rules of CIL that have been in
place for a long time, states that wish to object but did not do so when
the rule was established have no further opportunity to do so. To the ex-
tent the lack of a subsequent objector doctrine explains the very limited
use of the persistent objector doctrine, the proposal herein helps to ad-
dress the problem.
Notice that the rational choice approach to CIL and the associated
implications for the persistent objector doctrine represent an important
change from existing views. Under this formulation, the exception is
justified because it adds value. As such, the working of the exception
should be adjusted to get as much value from it as possible. This is in
stark contrast to many existing views that treat the exception as a neces-
sary evil, required by some notion of sovereignty and consent, and
suggesting that the exception should be cabined and discouraged as
much as possible.
cannot identify a particular day when it happens, at some point we can say that the state is
affected and it is the proper time for the state to object.
246. See D'AMATO, supra note 2, at 187-99, 233-34.
247. Stein, supra note 120.
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C. New States
1. The Existing Doctrine of New States
This Article's approach can also provide a clear explanation of how
new states come to be bound by CIL. When a state comes into being af-
ter the establishment of a rule of CIL, the majority view is that it is
unable to take advantage of the persistent objector doctrine .1 8 The theo-
retical justification for the rule governing new states is problematic. 249
Commentators typically claim that new states are bound by customary
law by virtue of their status as states.250 Byers argues that a new state,
"by participating in the customary process and relying on customary
rules, is implicitly consenting to that process as well as to all of the cus-
tomary rules which have previously been developed through it. '251' This
claim reduces the notion of consent to an absurd fiction. There is no
sense in which a state chooses or consents to participate in the "custom-
ary process." It is not possible to be a state without participating. So the
argument is really that new states are subject to existing rules of CIL,
without the ability to object, simply because they are states.
Not only is this argument contrary to consent-based notions of CIL,
it demonstrates how conclusory CIL discussions often become. Most
discussions of new states simply apply existing rules to these new mem-
bers of the international community. This should not surprise us. Once
again, without a sound theory to explain and understand CIL, there is no
principled way to determine how its rules should apply in novel situa-
tions. Faced with the emergence of many new states, then, commentators
simply applied existing rules in a mechanical fashion without considera-
tion of the particular characteristics of new states.
248. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES, § 210 cmt. i (1987); Akehurst, supra note 4. There is a minority view that new states
can exempt themselves from a rule if they object shortly after they become states. See VIL-
LIGER, supra note 123, at 16 ("Newly independent States are treated as persistent objectors, if
they raise their objections within a reasonable period of time after their emergence as States,
even if the customary rule has already emerged."). Even Villiger, however, does not accept a
"subsequent objector" rule. See id. at 17-18; see also Gennady M. Danilenko, The Theory of
International Customary Law, 31 GERMAN Y.B. INT'L L. 9, 44 (1988) ("[N]ew States may be
held to be bound by customary norms only if their binding character has in one form or an-
other been recognized by them.").
249. See Kelly, supra note 6, at 508 ("This disparate treatment [between new States and
persistent objectors] reflects an incoherence that cannot be reconciled with either the consent
or consensus theory of CIL or the concept of customary law.").
250. See FRANCK, supra note 32.
251. BYERS, supra note 2, at 77.
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2. A Rational Choice Analysis of New States
The proposed rules governing the applicability of CIL to new states
emerge naturally from the discussion that has already been presented.
First, new states are generally bound by existing rules of CIL for the
same reasons every other state is bound-as a result of opinio juris
among states as a group. Because the theory of obligation is not based on
a notion of consent, convoluted arguments attempting to reconcile no-
tions of consent with the arrival of new states can be dispensed with.
Under this same reasoning, however, it follows that new states
should have the same opportunity to object to rules of CIL as do estab-
lished states. Even if one adopts the narrow notion that states must object
from the time a rule is formed, the only coherent position would be to
give new states the opportunity to object from the time the state is
formed. The logic here is simple: if a persistent objector rule is desirable
from a systemic perspective, it is because giving states the ability to ob-
ject offers benefits that outweigh the costs. One way of reducing the
opportunistic use of the persistent objector rule is to demand that states
object from the time of the formation of the rule. New states obviously
cannot object before they are formed, so they must either be allowed to
object to existing rules from the time they are formed or not at all. If al-
lowing objection is desirable in general, it is also desirable for new
states. The only remaining concern, then, is whether there is too great a
potential for opportunistic objections by a new state. If objection must
take place soon after the establishment of a state, however, it seems
unlikely that there would be any more opportunism than is present when
states choose to object at the formation of a rule.252
A state should be permitted to object to a rule of CIL at the
time of the state's formation. An objecting new state should be
treated in the same way as a persistent objector.
The proposed exception for new states is, in effect, a special case of
the subsequent objector proposal advanced earlier, in which a state may
establish itself as a subsequent objector once it has an interest in a rule.5 3
Because the new state has not had the opportunity to do so prior to its
formation, the first moment at which it has an interest is when it
252. New states are also relevant to existing custom because they become part of the
international dynamic by which custom is formed and changed. If a large number of new
states enter the system, as happened following the Second World War, for example, existing
rules of CIL may be changed if these new states do not share the opiniojuris of existing states.
253. See supra Part V.C.
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becomes a state. This would allow the state, under the subsequent objec-
tor proposal, to object at that time.
D. Adjudication and CIL
If CIL is viewed in functional terms, as this Article proposes, there is
a question of its treatment by international and domestic tribunals. By
their nature, courts are more comfortable with doctrinal questions that
allow them to apply settled law to the facts at hand and reach a decision
in the case. In principle, traditional definitions of CIL had this doctrinal
character. Norms for which there was the requisite state practice and ap-
propriate opinio juris were rules of CIL, and tribunals could declare
them to be so. In practice, CIL has been anything but easy for courts to
apply. Among other problems, and as shown throughout this Article, the
requirements for a rule of CIL are not at all settled (contrary to the tradi-
tional definition) and systematic canvassing of state practice is virtually
impossible.
A functional definition of CIL presents its own difficulties for tribu-
nals, but their task is dramatically simplified relative to the traditional
view. To begin with, there is no need for a universal assessment of state
practice; all that matters is an assessment of opinio juris. This, needless
to say, is not simple, but it is easier than an inquiry into both opinio juris
and practice. The discussion in this Article also gives considerable guid-
ance about how evidence should be evaluated. As discussed with respect
254to state practice, evidence that is more probative of opinio juris should
be given more weight.
The rational choice approach presented in this Article also sheds
light on the role of international tribunals when they make CIL deci-
sions. The assumption that states are self-interested and have no
underlying preference for compliance with international law implies that
they will only comply with the decisions of tribunals when doing so is in
their interest. This means that the key function of a tribunal cannot be to
compel compliance.
Once we recognize how CIL and reputational sanctions work, how-
ever, the value of tribunals is clear. When a neutral third party evaluates
the facts of a case and issues a decision, all states, whether involved in
the case or not, receive information about the behavior of the parties to
the case. If, for example, a tribunal finds that a state has violated a CIL
obligation, other states can use that information to update their beliefs
about the defendant. If the defendant is exonerated, it will avoid any re-
254. See supra Part IV.
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putational loss (and may enjoy a reputational gain). The key function of
the tribunals, then, is informational. They clarify the state of the law, the
actions taken by the states, and the interplay of law and fact. Better in-
formation leads to sharper distinctions between states that tend to
comply with international law and those that tend to violate it.
VI. CONCLUSION
CIL is an easy target for critics. While it is central to our understand-
ing of international law, whatever theoretical justifications it may have
had in the past (natural law and consent) are either dismissed by modem
theorists (natural law) or difficult to reconcile with doctrine (consent).
Without a theoretical base on which to build, CIL has become a collec-
tion of doctrinal claims and counterclaims, few of which can be
demonstrated to be either true or false and most of which have weak jus-
tifications. It is hardly surprising that such a vulnerable area of law
should find itself challenged.
Yet stripped to its most basic level, there is no a priori reason to
think that a theory of CIL cannot be developed. It seems eminently plau-
sible that states interacting with one another over time would develop
norms to guide behavior. It is similarly plausible that some such norms
would come to be regarded as "law."
Defending CIL from attack is reason enough to develop a theory that
can explain this set of legal norms, but there is more at stake. If one con-
cludes that CIL is irrelevant, it becomes difficult to understand how other
aspects of international law can be sustained. There is, after all, no en-
forcement authority for international law obligations. Although a treaty
is a written agreement, its enforcement must depend on largely the same
mechanisms as does the enforcement of CIL. In both cases, a failure to
comply may prompt some form of retaliatory action by other states, or it
may generate a reputational cost. If we conclude that these forces are not
present in the CIL context, it is difficult to see why they would be pre-
sent in the treaty context. In this sense, a defense of CIL is related to a
defense of international law more generally.
It is not only critics of CIL that must be addressed. Supporters of
CIL, many of whom are among the most prominent figures in interna-
tional law, must recognize that current notions of CIL are untenable. As
this Article shows, existing views of CIL lack theoretical consistency and
integrity. It is past time to adopt a more rigorous approach to analyzing
this source of international law.
The good news is that once one adopts a standard social science ap-
proach to CIL, it is possible to develop a fairly comprehensive
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understanding of how international legal norms can affect behavior and
how CIL doctrine should be viewed. This Article does not exhaust the
implications of this approach, but it does demonstrate that it is possible
to build a strong and coherent foundation for CIL.
Critics of CIL should recognize that there is no theoretical reason
why CIL cannot exist or why it cannot influence state behavior. Support-
ers of CIL should recognize that much of our understanding of this
source of law must evolve to reflect a more rigorous approach to the
topic.
